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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Recording of Liens-Certificate of Title
The problem of the mobility of the modern automobile versus the
tenacity of the recording statutes has once again come to the forefront.
It is quite apparent from the recent case of General Finance and Thrift
Corporation v. Guthrie' that the recordation statutes as they pertain to
S227 N. C. 431, 42 S. E. 2d 601 (1947).
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the mortgage2 or sale of automobiles on credit3 are clearly outmoded
and in dire need of major repair, or preferably, of replacement.
Charles M. York, for several months a resident of Macon, Georgia,
purchased an automobile there on May 30, 1946 on conditional sale.
The conditional sale contract was, on the same day, assigned to the
plaintiff finance corporation. It was not, however, offered for recorda-
tion until June 5. There was evidence which tended to show that York
left Macon with the car and arrived at the home of his parents in
Greensboro, North Carolina, on June 3, two days before the conditional
sale, contract was offered for recordation in Georgia. On June 12,
York sold the car to Hodges in Greensboro who shortly thereafter sold
it to the defendant Guthrie. The car bore a Georgia license plate.
Hodges had been told by his employer that York had been in some
trouble and was advised not to have too much to do with him. In an
action to recover the car from Guthrie, the trial court charged the jury
peremptorily in favor of plaintiff. On appeal the North Carolina
Supreme Court granted a new trial on the ground that since there was
evidence on the part of the defendant that the car was brought to this
state prior to the filing of the conditional sale contract for record in
Georgia, a peremptory instruction in favor of plaintiff was error.
Having remanded on the question of the location of the chattel at
the time of the filing of the conditional sale contract for recordation,
the court did not consider whether or not Hodges was a bona fide
purchaser. This factor is pertinent to the issue as the case was decided
upon the Georgia recordation statutes under the principle of comity.
The Georgia statute requires that the third party act in good faith and
without notice in order to defeat an unrecorded lien.4  Had the case
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "No deed of trust or mortgage for real or
personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or
purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor,
but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where
the land lies;- or in case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or mort-
gagor resides; or in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of the
state, then in the county where the said personal estate, or some part of the same,
is situated; or in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee or mort-
gagee resides. For the purposes mentioned in this section the principal place of
business of a domestic corporation is its residence."
I N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-23: "All conditional sales of personal property
in which the title is retained by the bargainor shall be reduced to writing and
registered in the same manner, for the same fees and with the same legal effect
as is provided for chattel mortgages, in the county where the purchaser resides,
or, in case the purchaser shall reside out of the state, then in the county where
the personal estate or some' part thereof is situated, or in case of choses in action,
where the donee, bargainee or mortgagee resides."
"GA. CoDE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §67-2501: "Deeds, mortgages, and liens of
all kinds, which are required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of
the superior court, shall, as against the interests of third parties acting in good
faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the
same property, take effect only from the time they are filed for record in the
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been decided upon North Carolina law the question as to whether or
not Hodges was a bona fide purchaser would have been irrelevant.5
The settled and oft-quoted rule in this state is that no actual notice,
however full and formal, will supply the place of registration.6
Under the general rule of comity, which is recognized in a majority
of the states,7 the execution and recording of a chattel mortgage or
other lien on personal property in the county and state where the, mort-
gagor then resided and where the property then was situated, constitutes
notice to subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor in another state to
which the property is subsequently removed without the consent of the
mortgagee.8  Some states by positive law require that, within a stated
period of time, foreign mortgages be recorded locally in order to pre-
serve their effectiveness there as against third parties.9 Some few states
refuse to recognize foreign mortgages at all on chattels which have been
removed thereto without a local recordation. 10 In the principal case
the court recognized the general rule of comity," but held the rule
clerk's office. The said clerk shall keep a docket for such filing, showing the
day and hour thereof, which docket shall be open for examination and inspection
as other records of his office."
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "... as against creditors or purchasers
for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor, . . ."
' Brown v. Burlington Hotel Corp., 202 N. C. 82, 161 S. E. 735 (1932) ; Elling-
ton v. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E. 307 (1927).
of the states,7 the execution and recording of a chattel mortgage or
' Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900) ; Note, 57 A. L. R. 702,
712 (1927).
" Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900) ; Finance Co. v. Clary,
227 N. C. 247, 41 S. E. 2d 760 (1947) ; Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327,
13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941) ; Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891) ;
RESTiTEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §268, comment c (1934) ; GOoDRIcH, CONFLICT
Op LAWS 154 (2d ed. 1938); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 364(1937); 10 Am. Jua., CHATrEL MORTGAGES, §19.
'ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 47, §111, Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley and Koonce,
187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914) ; GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §67-108, Hub-
bard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886); W. VA. CODE (Michie, et al., 1943) §3996,
Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 120 W. Va. 420, 198 S. E. 875 (1938).
"0 Corbett v. Littlefeld, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. W. 581 (1890) ; Chambers v. Con-
solidated Garage Co., 231 Tex. 1072, 210 S. W. 565 (1919). As Louisiana does
not permit chattel mortgages at all, it is impossible to record a foreign mortgage
there, and such mortgage will not be effective in that state. Delop v. Windsor,
26 La. Ann. 185 (1874). VA. CODE ANN. (1942) §5197: "No mortgage, deed of
trust, or other encumbrance created upon personal property while such property
is located in another State shall be a valid encumbrance upon said property after
it is removed into this State as to purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice and creditors unless and until the said mortgage, deed of trust, or other
encumbrance be recorded according to the laws of this State in the county or cor-
poration in which the said property is located in this State."
"' Attention should be called to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Barnhill,.
General Finance and Thrift Corp. v. Guthrie, 227 N. C. 431, 434, 42 S. E. 2d
601, 604, in which he reiterates that the effect of N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)§47-20 on the general rule of comity was not decided. Universal Finance Co. v.
Clary, 227 N. C. 247. However, see Thayer, J., Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449(C. C. A. 8th 1900) : ". . . the statutes of a state which prescribe how mortgages
on personal property shall be executed and recorded are generally, if not uni-
versally, regarded as speaking with respect to mortgages made within the state
upon property there situated, and as having no reference to personalty brought
within the state which is at the time encumbered with a valid lien created else-
where," citing Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891). Text
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inapplicable where the chattel is removed before recordation from the
state of original situs. In drawing such distinction the North Carolina
Court is in accord with the decided cases. 12
Conceding the holding to be with the great weight of authority, it
has been argued that such a distinction is unsound and unwarranted.
This argument is based upon the contention that actually the notice
afforded the prospective vendee of the mortgagor' 8 in the state to which
the property has been removed is the same regardless of whether the
chattel, at the time of recordation, is within or without the confines of
the state of original situs, provided the lien is recorded before the mort-
gagor sells. Even conceding that the basis stated for such argument
is true, it does not necessarily follow that the distinction made by the
court is wholly unfounded. An examination must first be made of the
basis for the mortgagee's right of action in the second state. Admittedly
the laws of one state do not operate in another state ex proprio Vigore.1 4
Therefore, recordation in the state of original situs cannot, by the force
of the law of that state, serve as constructive notice beyond its bound-
aries.15 The mortgagee then is not in court in the second state to enforce
the law. of the state of original situs as a matter of right, but on the
st.renigth of the recognition there of the law of the state of original situs
under the principle of comity.16 Comity, at best, is a rather nebulous
concept; however, it is everywhere recognized that, at most, it is the
geographical extension of a right which was valid in its inception.17
Comity cannot be said to give validity to a right which would not be
recognized in the state of original situs.18 Recordation of a chattel
vriters also generally agree that recordation statutes do not affect the general
rule of comity unless such statutes are expressly or by clear implication applicable
to contracts made out of the state, in respect to property subsequently brought into
the state. 11 Am. JuR., CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§75, 77, 78; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §154 (2d ed. 1938); BF.LI, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §266.2 (1935);
JONEs, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §260a (6th ed. 1933); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§268, 275; STUmBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS '361 (1937).
2 Bridges v. Barrett, 6- Ill. App. 122 (1906); Carroll v. Nisbet, 95 S. D.
479, 70 N. W. 634 (1897) ; Cunningham v. Donelson, 110 W. Va. 331, 158 S. E.
1705 (1931); Yund v. First National Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6
(1905) ; see Golt v. Dibrell, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 146, 153 (1836); RESTATEMENT,
CONFICT OF LAwS, §265 (1934).
' By construction and extension of the language of N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
§47-23 the court has developed the rule that conditional sales are in legal effect
chattel mortgages in North Carolina. Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E.
200 (1933). Throughout this note, therefore, the terms "mortgage," "mort-
gagee," and "mortgagor" will include respectively, "conditional sale contract,"
"conditional vendor," and "conditional vendee."
"4 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §1.6 (1935); 11 Am. JuR., CONFLICT OF LAWS,§4.
15See Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 312, 79 S. W. 796 (1904), overruled on
another point in Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W. 490 (1911).SSnyder v. Yates, supra note 15.
"Applewhite Co. v.- Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936).
182 BEALE CONFLICT OF LAWS §267.1 (1935).
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mortgage after the chattel covered thereby has been removed to another
state is said to be ineffective.10 Under that doctrine it is apparent that
the distinction drawn by the court is valid.
This state of the law places the mortgagee in a precarious position.
A scoundrel, knowing the law, can on Saturday afternoon, after the
office of the Register of Deeds has closed, purchase an automobile in
any town in North Carolina, execute a chattel mortgage with knowledge
that it cannot be recorded until Monday morning and easily cross the
state border before the mortgage can be recorded. Even after the mort-
gage has been recorded, he can state the actual facts to his purchaser
in another state and the mortgagee will lose his security upon proof.
by the second purchaser that the automobile was removed from North
Carolina before the mortgage was recorded 20
The solution to this problem does not lie in the opposite holding,
i.e., that recordation is notice to all the world irrespective of the location
of the chattel at that time. Such holding, perhaps, would be more
equitable under the facts of the principal case since examination of
the record at Macon on the day of purchase would have disclosed the
lien, but it would necessarily cover other fact situations in which it
would place an undue burden upon an innocent purchaser. For instance,
suppose X purchases a car in Charleston, South Carolina, from Z and
executes a chattel mortgage thereupon covering a large portion of the
purchase price. The next week X, for business reasons, removes the
automobile and his family permanently to Greensboro, North Carolina.
The mortgage is not recorded in Charleston. Six months later X de-
cides to sell the car to Y, a resident of Greensboro, stating there are no
liens or incumbrances outstanding against it. Y ascertains that the car
was purchased in Charleston and has a search made of the records there,
which of course, is fruitless. A week later Y and Z consummate the
sale, but in the meantime Z has heard of the preliminary dickering in
Greensboro and rushes down and records the mortgage two days before
the sale is consurhmated. Z's claim is superior to'that of Y under the
supposed state of law, the recordation being notice to the world irre-
spective of the location of the chattel at the time, and Y, after having
exercised reasonable diligence, is out the price paid for the automobile.2 1
10 Bridges v. Barrett, 126 I11. App. 122 (1906); Carrol v. Nisbet, 95 S. D.
479, 70 N. W. 654 (1897) ; Yund v. First National Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81,
82 Pac. 6 (1905).
" It is recognized that in North Carolina a mortgagor who removes the chattel
with intent to defeat the mortgagee is subject to criminal penalty, N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §14-114.
"It is recognized that this situation is not peculiar to interstate transactions.
The very same situation may well arise in an intrastate sale under the present
law. It is felt, however, that to extend the doctrine to include interstate sales,
thereby involving greater distances, would greatly prejudice the rights of the
vendee from the mortgagor.
19481
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It is submitted that as a stopgap, i.e., an immediate remedy for these
situations until a more suitable remedy is provided, relief may be had
by the insertion of a reasonable time provision into the present recorda-
tion statutes.2 2 The number of days determined to be a reasonable time
should be specifically set forth in the statute. It should then be pro-
vided that if a chattel mortgage or lien covering a motor vehicle or any
equipment or accessories therefor which are in the state when the se-
curity is created is recorded within the stated time such recordation shall
constitute notice from the date of execution of the mortgage or other
lien whether or not the chattel is removed subsequent to the creation of
the security.23 Under such statute the general rule of comity would
protect the mortgagee against a sale in another state following an un-
authorized removal prior to the actual recordation, provided the chattel
was located within the state of original situs at the time the mortgage or
other lien was executed. The chattel is normally in the state of original
situs at the time of the execution of the mortgage as the execution of
the mortgage and delivery of the chattel are generally performed simul-
taneously.
Though the insertion of the reasonable time clause would offer
relief to the vendor in North Carolina who records the title retention
instrument without delay, it by no means suffices to enable recordation
fully to accomplish its purpose. The purpose of recordation is twofold,
to give notice of the divided ownership and to protect innocent third
parties against fraud.24  The present recordation statutes as they per-
tain to'mortgages executed in North Carolina 25 require that the instru-
ment be filed in the county of which the vendee is a resident and if the
vendee be a non-resident, then in the county where the chattel is lo-
cated.2 6 There is no requirement of a second recordation upon a change
of residence within the state by the mortgagor.27 A chattel mortgage filed
in the wrong county is ineffective. 28 As to foreign mortgages on chattels
brought into this state the North Carolina court, in Truck Corporation
v. Wilkins,29 recognized the general rule of comity, stating that a foreign
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.22See VA. CoDE ANN. (1942) §5189: ". . . provided, that if such filing for
docketing be done within five days from the delivery of the goods and chattel to
the vendee, it shall be as valid as to creditors and purchasers as if such filing for
docketing had been done on the day of such delivery of the goods and chattels."
Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 67 S. E. 48 (1910).
" Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900); Hornthal v. Burwell,
109 N. C. 10, 15, 13 S. E. 721, 722 (1891).
2 6In re Franklin, 151 Fed. 642 (E. D. N. C. 1907) ("County where mortgagor
resides," refers to county in which he resides at the time the mortgage is made) ;
Bank v.*Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20,
47-23.2 Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 86, 10 S. E. 127 (1888).
21 Bank v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) ; Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C.
431, 6 S. E. 370 (1887).2219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941).
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lien properly executed and recorded in the state of original situs will be
upheld in this state without local recordation as against North Carolina
purchasers or creditors who attach the chattel in North Carolina. The
difficult position of the vendee of a used automobile brought into the
state for resale was recognized by the passage of a statute in 1937 reg-
ulating the sales of such automobiles.30 The portion of the statute
requiring the execution of a bond to cover possible losses to the North
Carolina vendee occasioned by failure of the title of the vendor was
held unconstitutional the same year.3 1 The statute was repealed in
1945.32
The prospective purchaser in North Carolina of a used car must
follow with care a prolonged procedure in order that he may purchase
with the assurance that'he will get title to the car. Suppose X, a resi-
dent of Charlotte, wishes to purchase a used car from Y, also a resident
of Charlotte. X must determine, first, whether Y was a resident of North
Carolina at the time he purchased the car, and secondly, whether Y
actually purchased the car inside North Carolina or in some other juris-
diction. Then: (a) If X finds Y was a resident of North Carolina at
the time he purchased the car and further that the car was purchased
in North Carolina, he must determine the county of which Y was at the
time a resident and search the records there ;33 (b) if X finds Y was a
resident of North Carolina but purchased the car outside the state, X
must ascertain what constitutes a valid lien in that jurisdiction against
a chattel in the possession of a non-resident, and then take the fiecessary
steps to determine if such lien exists ;34 (c) if X discovers that Y was
not a resident of North Carolina at the time he purchased the car, but
that the sale was consummated within this state, he must determine in
what county the chattel was situated at the time Y made the purchase
and search the records there;35 (d) upon discovery that Y, at the time
he purchased the car, was not a resident of North Carolina and that
the sale was consummated outside the state, the fact situation of the
principal case, X must determine what constitutes a valid, lien in that
jurisdiction and take the necessary steps to determine if such lien
exists.3 6
It appears that under the present recordation statutes the North
Carolina vendor is in a precarious position and as to the North Carolina
vendee the expression "caveat emptor" has great significance. Under
such circumstances it would certainly appear desirable to adopt a dif-
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-220 through 20-223.
- McLain v. Hoey, 19 F. Supp. 990 (E. D. N. C. 1937).N. C. Sess. Laws 1945, c. 635.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.
,Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.
"Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941).
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ferent method of registering automobile liens, one which provides central
registration for the whole state, simplifies the procedure for registration
and investigation, and combines actual notice through documents in
common use in the trade with constructive notice through recordation
in one place. In a recent note3 7 it was very ably pointed out that the
fundamentals of such a system exist at present in the provisions of the
North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act.38 Attention was directed to the
pertinent provisions of the Act and their adaptability to the proposed
system was pointed out. The author also proposed and submitted for
adoption as an addition to the present Act the provisions necessary to
put the desired method of registering automobile liens into effect.30 It.
3 1Note, 24 N. C. L. Ray. 63 (1945).38 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-38 through 20-84.
"Note, 24 N. C. L. Rzv. 63, 71 (1945) :
"1. No mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention contract, or
other lien or encumbrance on or covering a motor vehicle or on any equipment or
accessories affixed or sold to be affixed to such vehicle shall be valid as against
creditors or subsequent purchasers or encumbrances but from its registration in
compliance with sections 2 to 6 of this act.
2. There shall be deposited with the register of deeds in the county where such in-
strument is executed a copy of the instrument evidencing such lien or encumbrance,
with an attached or endorsed certificate of a notary public, accompanied by the
certificate of title last issued for such vehicle, or if no certificate has been issued
therefor, by an application by the owner for an original certificate of title. Upon
receipt of the above documents in proper order the regsiter of deeds shall endorse
thereon the date and hour received, and shall collect a registration fee, which shall
be uniform throughout the state. On the same day on which received, the register
of deeds shall forward said documents, together with such part of the fee charged
as may be prescribed by statute, to the department of motor vehicles for filing
and recording of the lien of encumbrance upon the certificate of title. Further filing
or registration in the office of register of deeds shall not be required nor of legal
effect.
3. Upon receipt of the copy of the instrument evidencing a lien or encumbrance
and the certificate of title or application therefor, the department shall file the
same, and shall issue a new certificate of title in usual form, giving the name of
the owner and a statement of all liens and encumbrances certified to the depart-
ment against said vehicle. The department shall maintain an appropriate index
of all lien, encumbrance or title retention instruments filed, and shall furnish upon
request information on liens and encumbrances against motor vehicles.
4. Such filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title shall constitute the
exclusive method of giving constructive notice of all mortgages, deeds of trust,
conditional sale or title retention contracts or other liens or encumbrances against
the vehicle described therein, and such mortgages and other instruments shall be
exempt from the provisions of sections 47-20 and 47-23 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina. Provided, that if the documents referred to above are received
and time of receipt endorsed thereon by the register of deeds within six days after
date said documents were executed, -constructive notice shall date from the time of
execution, otherwise from the time of receipt as shown by the endorsement of the
register of deeds thereon.
5. The holder or owner of every mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or
title retention contract or other lien or encumbrance on any vehicle registered in
another state and filed or recorded in that state shalf within ninety days after such
vehicle is removed to this state file with the department of motor vehicles the
original or a certified copy of such mortgage or other instrument. Every Mort-
gage or other instrument not so filed shall be subject to any lien or encumbrance
against such vehicle thereafter filed with the department according to this act,




is resubmitted that the proposed system be adopted. In order to give
added assurance that recordation will accomplish its twofold purpose,
it is submitted that the following suggestions should be incorporated
into and adopted with the already proposed sections:
1. Delivery of the certificate of title by the Motor Vehicle Depart-
ment should be to the person in whose name the certificate is
issued.
Under the present provision, certificates of title upon which liens or
encumbrances are shown are delivered or mailed by the department to
the holder of the first lien or encumbrance.4" It is felt that having the
certificate in the hands of the possessor of the automobile .has definite
advantages over the present system. The vendor of equipment for the
car or a person who is about to take a second mortgage on the car
as collateral security for a loan could readily determine the- actual state
of the title to the automobile before he completes the transaction. Should
the mortgagor attempt to sell the car his prospective vendee would be
afforded a convenient means of determining the status of the title. The
fact that the certificate is today held at perhaps some distant locality by
the first lienholder is often costly to trusting third parties.
2. Every satisfaction of a lien should be acknowledged before a
notary public and a certification thereof be obtained from the
notary.
The only apparent opportunity for fraud resulting in the possession of
the certificate of title by the mortgagor lies in the opportunity afforded
him to mark the debt satisfied and subsequently represent such to be a
fact in the furtherance of a resale. It is felt that the suggestion just
made would almost wholly remove the possibility of such fraud.
3. Each dealer should be required to obtain a certificate of title
for every new car received.
It is felt that this requirement would not constitute a hardship upon the
dealer. On the other hand such a provision would afford every pro-
spective purchaser of a new car a convenient means of determining the
status of the title thereto. It is believed that such a provision would
prevent the purchase of new cars by innocent parties only to discover
that they have bought a law suit.
41
6. This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its rati-
fication, except that it 'shall not affect the validity of any mortgage, deed of trust,
conditional sale or title retention contract, or other lien or encumbrance on a
motor vehicle which was executed and registered according to law at the date of
such ratification. But all such mortgages and other instruments not filed with the
department within a period of six months after said date of ratification shall be
subject to liens and encumbrances thereafter filed against such vehicle."
40 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-57(f).
' Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928).
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4. The sale of an automobile which is not accompanied by a sur-
render of the certificate of title to the vendee should be tendered
null and void.
Compliance with this suggestion would work a hardship on neither
party. It is simply a police measure for the purpose of rendering it
virtually impossible for a person to purchase a car without having been
afforded every possible opportunity to determine if there is a lien out-
standing thereon. As all liens or encumbrances are shown on the cer-
tificate, this suggestion would afford actual as well as constructive notice
of all encumbrances against the car to the prospective vendee.4
A national registration system is the ultimate goal to be achieved. 43
Today seventeen states and the -District of Columbia make the certificate
constructive notice of liens and encumbrances, and exempt mortgages on
automobiles from the general recording acts.44  In addition there are
many other states, including North Carolina,45 which require certificates
of title for motor vehicles, but do not make notations of liens on the
certificates constructive notice. This legislative trend is laying the
foundation, which it is believed will bring reasonably uniform state
statutes and perhaps national registration into being in the near future.
It is felt that North Carolina's adoption of the proposed system, in addi-
tion to giving real meaning to constructive notice in this state, would
bring nation-wide registration one step nearer to actuality.
WILLIAM H. BURTON, JR.
12 Even conceding that there is a strong argument against making the sale void
for noncompliance, it is submitted that such a strong sanction will in the long run
afford greater protection to the vendees by producing a universally known prac-
tice of surrendering the title certificate to the vendee.
" Isaacs, Installment Selling: The Relation Between Its Development in Mod-
em Business and the Law, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoM 140 at 146 (1935).
"ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) §66-231; CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943) Vehicle
Code §195-8; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §5574(a) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) §319.15;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §48-402, as amended by IDAHO SESS. LAWS 1941, c. 144;
MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) §9.1497 (applies to accessories only) ;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §3488, as amended by LAWS OF Mo. (1941), "Conveyances"
(excepts mortgages given for purchase money, motor vehicles sold by the manu-
facturer or their distributing dealer, and "mortgages given by dealers to secure
loans on the floor plan stock of motor vehicles:'); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §1758.3; NEB. Comp. S'rAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941)
§60-1009, as amended by NEB. SEss. LAWS 1943, c. 134, §4; NEV. Comp. LAWS
(Supp. 1931-41) §4435, as amended by NEv. STAT. 1945, c. 240 §§15(a)-(g) ; N. J.
STAT. ANN. (1940) §39:10-14 (conditional sales only); N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941)
§§68-113-9, as amended by N. M. LAWS 1943, c. 73, §§8, 10; OHIo GEN. CODE
ANN. (Page, 1938) §6290-9; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 75, §§33,
38; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1, §41-5; UTAH CODE
ANN. -(1943) §§57-3a-80-7; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942)
§2154(64) (b) ; D. C. CODE (1940) §40-702.
" Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 160, 129 S. E.
414. 416 (1925).
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Constitutional Law-Contempt by Publication
Petitioners, a publisher, an editorial writer, and a news reporter pub-
lished a serie3 of news articles which were not an accurate report of
the facts of a case or of the issue before the judge. An editorial called
the judge's refusal to hear both sides of the case "high-handed," a
"travesty on justice," said that public opinion was "outraged," and
deplored the fact that the judge was a "layman" and not a competent
attorney. The trial judge concluded that the reports and editorial were
designed falsely to represent the nature of the proceedings and to
prejudice and influence the court in its ruling on a pending motion for
a new trial. The petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt and
sentenced to jail for three days. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied.1 On.certiorari held, three judges dissenting, reversed. The
articles and the editorial did not constitute a clear and present danger
to the administration of justice.2
The history of summary proceedings for contempt by publication in
this country presents an interesting conflict betwen the right of freedom
of speech and of the press, and the right to fair and orderly administra-
tion of justice.3
Courts early assumed the power to punish summarily for constructive
contempts.4 Legislatures fearing that the power. was open to serious
misuse sought to define it by statute.5 The judiciary proved reluctant
and soon again reasserted its power.6 After the famous impeachment
trial of Judge Peck in 1831, 7 the federal courts' contempt powers were
limited by Congress to those committed in the presence of the court, or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.8  The federal
courts followed what seemed to be the intent of Congress in their con-
struction of this act0 until in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States0
the Supreme Court said that "so near thereto' was not a spatial limita-
tion, and that contempts by publication could be punished if they had
'Ex Parte Craig, 193 S. W. 2d 178 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946).
'Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.)
1141 (1947).
'See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COL.
L. Rev. 401 et seq. (1928).
'Respublica v. Qswald, 1 Dall. 319 (U. S. 1788).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §5-1 (7); N. Y. JuDiCLAY LAW §750; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17 §2044.
* State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855) (power necessary to preserve judiciary);
State v. Tugwell, 19 Wash. 238, 52 Pac. 1056 (1898) (statute declaratory, not
restrictive).
7 See Nelles and King, supra note 3, at 423, for an excellent discussion of
Judge Pecek's impeachment trial.
84 STAT. 487 (1831). 28 U. S. C. §385 (1940).
'Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1883) (disbarring an attorney for riotous
conduct) ; Kirk v. United States, 192 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 9th 1911) (corrupting an
expected juror).10 247 U. S. 402 (1918).
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a reasonable tendency to obstruct the administration of justice."1 This
rule stood until in Nye v. United States 2 the court gave the statute its
obvious meaning by holding that "near" in this context meant physical
proximity and not relevancy.
In Bridges v. California,13 in a five to four decision, the clear and
present danger test14 was first adopted to contempts by publication, the
court saying that before contempt will lie in publication cases, the sub-
stantive evil that is threatened must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.'5
This was followed by an unanimous decision in Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida 6 in which the application of the test in constructive contempt cases
was reaffirmed. The Supreme Court also made it evident that it would
make no distinction between contempts based on state statutes and con-
tempts at common law.' 7
In the principal case the Texas court in denying the writ of habeas
corpus recognized that the clear and present danger test governed1 8 but
sought to distinguish the Bridges case on the fact that there labor con-
troversies were involved.' 9
The Supreme Court, while conceding that the nature of the case is
relevant in determining whether the clear and present danger test is satis-
fied, stated that the rule of both the Bridges and Pennekamp cases serves
the needs of any type of litigation. 0
The court has recognized the difficulties inherent in applying the
clear and present danger rule to specific situations in the contempt by
publication field and has expressed the hope that the rule would take
substance through the process of judicial interpretation.2' A case more
extreme than either the Bridges, Pennekamp, or Craig cases must appear
before this can be realized. However, language of Mr. Justice Murphy
11The rule of this case brought sharp criticism. Frankfurter and Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts, 37 HARv. L. REV.
1010, 1029 (1924). Nelles and King, supra note 3, at 540.
12313 U. S. 33 (1941).
18314 U. S. 252 (1941).
14The clear and present danger doctrine was first laid down in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), a case involving distribution of leaflets en-
couraging draftees to evade conscription. The rule has been applied to many civil
liberties situations: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) (conviction under
statute against insurrection), Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) (statutes
against peaceful picketing), Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (statute
restricting solicitation of labor union membership).5 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263 (1941).
21328 U. S. 331 (1946).
"'The Florida court sought to distinguish the Bridges case since California
had no statute providing for contempt by publication. This distinction was not
discussed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Pennekamp case.IsEx parte Craig, 193 S. W. 2d 178, 188 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946).
19 Ibid.
2 Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1256, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1141, 1147 (1947).
2" Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 334 (1946).
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in the Pennekamp and Craig cases would seem to indicate that the clear
and present danger rule removes from the area of summary contempt
proceedings all comment except that which threatens to create a situation
in which it would become impossible for the courts to carry on their
business. 22
The conclusion that does emerge from these three cases is that the
Supreme Court has determined that the right to freedom of speech and
press requires a nation-wide, uniform policy 23 and that when the free-
dom of comment conflicts with the right to a fair and orderly adminis-
tration of justice, the former will weigh heavily against the latter.24
It is believed that this rejection of the principle of judicial absolutism
is more consonant with our fundamental ideas of the functions of a free
press in a democracy than the views which formerly prevailed on the
power of judges to punish summarily for contempt by publication. 25
DONALD W. McCoy.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Discrimination
Against Negroes in Selection of -Jury
The question of denial of equal protection of the laws by discrimina-
tion against Negroes in selection of juries has recently arisen again in
North Carolina.'
"- "To talk- of a clear and present danger arising out of such criticism is idle
unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a court to carry
on the administration of* justice." Mr. Justice Murphy concurring in Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 369 (1946). "The only possible exception is in the
rare instance where the attack might reasonably cause a real impediment to the
administration of justice." Mr. Justice Murphy concurring in Craig v. Harney,
U. S. -, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1258, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1141, 1149 (1947).
CHAFEE FREE SPEECm IN THE UNITED STATES. (1941), p. 6.
Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1141, 1144 (1947).
"' The court leaves open the question of the power of a state to protect the
administration of justice by means other than summary contempt process.
U. S. - . 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1141, 1144 (1947).
1 In Spring Term, 1947, there were seven cases involving this question: State
v. Koritz, 227 N. C. 552, 43 S. E. 2d 77 (1947); State v. Brunson, 227 N. C.
558, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ; State v. Jones, 227 N. C. 558, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ;
State v. King, 227 N. C. 559, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ; State v. Watkins, 227 N. C.
560, 43 S. E. 2d 83 (1947) ; State v. James, 227 N. C. 561, 43 S. E. 2d 83 (1947) ;
State v. Kirksey, 227 N. C. 445, 43 S. E. 2d 613 (1947). The opinion of the
Koritz case was adopted in all of the others cited except State v. Kirksey. There
a Negro was indicted for murder. After exhausting his peremptory challenges,
he challenged the twelfth juror passed by the state peremptorily, in that he was a
white man and jury was composed solely of white persons. Judge heard evidence
and found as fact: that Negroes had been regularly summoned for jury duty in
the county, that Negroes' names had not been excluded from the jury box and
that there was no evidence before the court that discrimination had been practised
because of race or color by the jury commissioners. It was held, on appeal, that
to take advantage of an irregularity in constitution of a whole panel, defendant
must have challenged the array. But that if challenge had .been timely and
appropriately taken, findings of fact by the presiding judge would be conclusive
on appeal in the absence of gross abuse.
19481
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In a recent case, 2 one white man and three Negroes were convicted
in a municipal court of resisting arrest. On trial de novo in the
Superior Court, defendants moved to quash the panel from which the
petit jury was to be drawn on ground of racial discrimination in its
selection. The court, after hearing evidence and examining elaborate
statistical affidavits, found no discrimination as a fact, that Negroes
were fairly represented in the jury box and overruled the motion. The
jury was then impanelled. Only twenty jurors were left on the regular
panel and defendants had twenty-four peremptory challenges. There-
upon the Court ordered a venire of twenty-five tales jurors, at least ten
of whom were to be Negroes. The jury as constituted consisted of six
names from the regular panel and six from the tales jurors, five of the
tales jurors who were selected being Negroes. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the question of exclusion of Negroes from the jury was
raised and the constitutionality of the jury selection statutes in North
Carolina was challenged. The convictions were affirmed. It was held
that the appellants were entitled to a fair and impartial jury, which
they had had, that the statutes in question8 were constitutional and that
the ruling on the motion to quash was supported by the evidence. It was
found that both parties had indicated satisfaction with the jury as con-
stituted, although this is not clear from the record.
The right of trial by a jury selected without racial discrimination is
insured basically by the "equal protection" clause4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and by two federal statutes enacted pursuant to the enabling
clause 5 of that amendment. One provides for removal of cases to the
federal courts when it appears that trial in a state court will not be
accompanied by protection of federal constitutional rights., The other
goes more directly to the point by making the practice of racial dis-
crimination in federal or state jury selection a misdemeanor.7
Unfortunately, federal and North Carolina decisions have not suc-
ceeded in drawing more than an extremely nebulous line between regular
selection and selection so discriminatory as to come within these con-
stitutional and legislative prohibitions. Certain fairly well-defined prin-
ciples have been established but beyond these each case seems to be
decided on its own peculiar factual situation. Familiarity with these
2 State v. Koritz, 227 N. C. 552, 43 S. E. 2d 77 (1947) ; cert. denied, - U. S.
68 S. Ct. 80, 92 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 22 (1947).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) c. 9.
'U.'S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. §1.
'U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV. §5.
'16 STAT. 144 (1870), 28 U. S. C. §74 (1940). This statute was restricted by
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879) to apply only where discrimina-
tion was by state law or constitutional provision.
" 18 STAT. 336 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §44 (1940). Held constitutional in EX parle
Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879) and held to apply to selection by state or federal
officers or agencies in state as well as in federal courts.
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judicial principles and with the most striking factual situations may be
relied upon to engender at least an intuitive "feeling" with regard to
any particular case in this field. To this end, a brief survey of the
application of the. doctrine in the federal courts and in the Supreme
Court of North Carolina would seem informative. Since the same
body of law applies to discrimination in selection of jurors, whether they
be grand or petit jurors, the cases will be discussed in that light.8
United States Supreme Court decisions have laid down several im-
portant principles. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments have as their purpose the abolition of involuntary servitude,
including freedom of the African race, security and perpetuation of
that freedom, and protection to colored men in itO Strauder v. West-
Virgihia'0 enunciated the doctrine that a statute taking from Negroes
the right and privilege of being jurors because of color was a denial
of equal protection of the laws. This interpretation was extended by
a contemporaneous decision" to officers and agencies of a state through
whom her powers were exerted. On the other hand a mixed jury is
not essential to equal protection of the laws and the right to it is not
given by federal statute or by-the Fourteenth Amendment.12
On motion to quash an indictment because of discrimination, evi-
dence should be heard and findings of fact made by the trial judge.'3
To raise the question in state courts, the proper state procedure must
be used.'4  Generally a challenge to the array before trial is used by
motion to quash the indictment' 5 (if one is found by grand jury) or by
motion to quash the petit jury panel if on warrant. And evidence must
be offered to prove the recitals in the affidavits supporting the motion
to quash, in absence of consent of prosecutors or court to the use of
such affidavit as evidence.' 6 There is a presumption that the officers
' Principles which forbid discrimination in selection of petit jurors govern
selection of grand jurors. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1938); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 580 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
o Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1870).
10 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
"Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879) (county judge of Virginia who
selected jurors was convicted of excluding Negro jurors solely on account of
color) ; accord, Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278 (1908) ; Martin v. Texas, 200
U. S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880). To come within the
ban of illegal action, the exclusion must be solely because of race or color. Vir-
ginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879).1 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880).
" Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900).
"' Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 (1903).
1 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1941) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940);
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1895).
" Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938) (affidavit supporting motion held
sufficient to reverse when consent of prosecutor conferred evidentiary status upon
it); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189
U. S. 426 (1903) ; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 (1903) ; Smith v. Mississippi,
162 U. S. 592 (1895) (motion- overruled in absence of evidence to support it,
though allegations of long exclusion adequate).
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or administrators who selected the jury acted lawfully and properly in
the discharge of their duty.17 Further, discrimination by exclusion may
riot be shown merely by proving that no one of complainant's race was
on either of the juries.18 Where there appeared upon the grand jury
returning the indictment a Negro, and Negroes were proved to have
been in the jury box and neither state constitution nor laws were
assailed, the question was held one of fact and findings of the trial
court remained undisturbed in the absence of such gross abuse as to
amount to a denial of due process of law.' 9 However, where a con-
clusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and findings of fact
are so intermingled that the latter control the former, the Supreme
Court will review the evidence to analyze the facts to enforce such
federal right.20
The burden is on the defendant to establish discrimination against
his race in selection of the jury.21 But a prima f~cie case of discrim-
ination may be made by a showing of long exclusion of Negroes from
the juries.22 This apparently is strengthened by a further showing of
Negroes in the vicinity qualified to be jurors. This presumption may
be rebutted by the prosecution, and the usual manner would seem to be
by proof that any Negroes who were excluded were disqualified by
other causes. Rebuttal of such a presumption would seem exceedingly
difficult.
The North Carolina court has, of course, recognized the fundamental
principle that the equal protection clause forbids discriminatory jury
selection. State v. Peoples23 invoked this principle in reversing a lower
court which had overruled the motion to quash indictment and motion
to quash petit panel. It is interesting to note that this is the only
North Carolina decision reversing on this ground. But here reversal
followed refusal by the trial court even to hear evidence on the question
" Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 (1903).S Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906).
" Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1944) (where it was stated that in examina-
tion of evidence to determine whether a federal constitutional right had been
denied, great respect was accorded the conclusions of the state judiciary) ; accord,
Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278 (1908).
" Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 580 (1935); accord, Patton v. Mississippi,
-U. S., 68 S. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 164 (1947) ; Smith v. Texas, 311
U. S. 128 (1940) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U. S. 354 (1938).
"Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1944) ; accord, Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.
316 (1906) ; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 (1903).
"Patton v. Mississippi, -U. S.-, 68 S. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 164(1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 580(1935); see Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 361 (1938); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U. S. 370, 397 (1880).
", 131 N. C. 784, 42 S. E.. 814 (1902) (exclusion of all Negroes from jury
which found indictment against Negro where they were excluded solely because
of color, was denial of equal protection of the laws).
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of discrimination 4  In reversing, our court held a motion to quash
indictment to be the proper remedy where Negroes had been excluded
from the grand jury solely because of color.25
In State v. Daniels,2 6 on motion to quash because of irregularity in
choosing white jurors disproportionately, it was held that the regula-
tions governing selection of jurors were directory and not mandatory
and that omission of qualified persons was not reversible error, if none
of the jurors used were unqualified.
On motion to quash petit panel in State v. Cooper,= the court re-
iterated that since there was no contention that any of the jurors used
were unqualified and since the trial court had found no discrimination
as a fact, after hearing evidence, the findings of fact could not be re-
viewed in that there was evidence sufficient to support the finding and
there was no gross abuse of discretion.
In 1937, State v. Walls2a was decided. Here, at a prior term, the
trial judge had quashed an indictment because of discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury 29 Removal to a federal court was attempted
and failed because of no partiality in state constitution or statute.30
New indictment was found by a grand jury from the same box as the
one that had made the previous indictment. Jury lists had names of
colored persons in red ink, those of whites in black ink. But when the
new indictment was found, there was one Negro on the grand jury. In
denying the motion, the trial judge found as a fact that there were 650
names of Negroes and 10,000 names of whites in jury box, and that
there was no discrimination. On trial, petit jury was selected from a
60 man special venire chosen by the sheriff, of whom four were Negro.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, refusing to disturb in face
of evidence to support the ruling of the trial judge.
The question has also arisen by motion in arrest of judgment.3 1 The
defendants showed that separate tax lists, from which jury lists were
compiled, were kept for white and colored and evidence was introduced
-' Record, p. 7, State v. Peoples, 131 N. C. 784, 42 S. E. 814 (1902) (trialjudge stated: "This court has not the power to quash the bill on the grounds
alleged . . . cannot investigate the matter alleged in said motion and affidavit
under motion to quash.").
2' See State v. Peoples, 131 N. C. 784, 791, 42 S. E. 814, 816 (1902) ; accord,
State v. Lord, 225 N. C. 354, 34 S. E. 2d 205 (1945) ; State v. Daniels, 134 N. C.
641. 46 S. E. 743 (1904) ; State v. Haywood, 94 N. C. 847 (1886).
2-134 N. C. 641, 46 S. E. 743 (1904) (here court heard evidence and found as
fact that jury lists had been regularly revised, with no discussion as to color,
and only questions of competency and fitness considered). But see Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 596 (1935) (where different result when jury commis-
sioners testified that color was never discussed).
-205 N. C. 657. 172 S. E. 199 (1933).
2s211 N. C. 487, 191 S. E. 232 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 635 (1937).
"Record, p. 3, State v. Walls, supra note 28.
'o See note 5 sipra.
2 State v. Bell, 212 N. C. 20, 192 S. E. 852 (1937).
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tending to show that only two Negroes had served on juries in the
county during the last 25 years although Negroes constituted forty per
cent of a population of 35,000. But there was a showing that ten names
of Negroes had been placed in the box at the last selection. No dis-
crimination was found as a fact and all jurors selected were found
qualified and unobjectionable. The Supreme Court on appeal held the
findings of fact conclusive as supported by the evidence, particularly
since the motion was made for the first time after verdict.32
The case that may be closest to the line in North Carolina is State
v. Henderson.33 A plea in abatement with supporting affidavit was filed
before trial. The supporting affidavit of the clerk to the county com-
missioners stated that to, his knowledge, having been present at each
time that names were placed in the box, no colored names had been
placed therein for 15 years at least "except on one occasion about two
years ago when a number of names of members of the Negro race were
placed in the jury box." It further asserted .that no names of Negroes
were placed in the box for the present term and that there were qualified
Negroes in the county. 4 The court, as far as shown by the record,
heard no evidence and found as a fact no discrimination. On appeal,
findings of fact below were held conclusive.
The motion to strike out order for special venire and to'dismiss
jurors summoned thereunder was overruled in State v. Lord.35 The
court had directed that special veniremen of the colored race be sum-
moned, number to bear the same proportion that colored people were
to whites in the county. In selecting jury, all of the Negroes summoned
were successfully challenged for. cause in that they were not freeholders.
The Supreme Court held that as there was nothing in the record to
show exclusion and that as there was no showing that the special venire-
men were not required to be freeholders" no error was shown.
Exceptions for disqualifications of grand jurors must be taken by
motion to quash indictment before jury is sworn and impanelled to
"After verdict, defendant may not object to selection of the jury. State v.
Banner, 149 N. C. 519, 63 S. E. 84 (1908) ; State v. Boon, 80 N. C. 461 (1879);
State v. Douglass, 63 N. C. 500 (1869).
"1 216 N. C. 99, 3 S. E. 2d 357 (1939).
, Record, p. 6, State v. Henderson, supra note 33. But cf. Patton v. Mississippi,
-U. S.-, 68 S. Ct 184, 92 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 164 (1947) (State's evidence that
within last 30 years a single Negro had once been summoned but had not served,
and that at some indefinite time the names of "two or three" unidentified Negroes
had been placed on jury list held, not sufficient to overcome "strong evidence" of
discrimination arising from uncontradicted showing of 30-year actual exclusion
from jury service).
"225 N. C. 354, 34 S. E. 2d 205 (1945). Cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370 (1880) (where Negro moved for proportional Negro representation on panel).
"Requirement that jurors summoned be freeholders depended upon whether
summoned under N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-29, where they must have been free-
holders, while if drawn from jury box being a freeholder not requisite to
qualification.
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try the issue and if not so taken, such exceptions are deemed to be
waived.8
7
When objection runs to the whole panel of jurors, it must be taken
advantage of by a challenge to the array.38 Challenge to the array can
only be taken where there is partiality or misconduct in the sheriff, or
some irregularity in making out the list.
3 9
A member of one race cannot complain because he has been indicted
or tried by a jury from which has been excluded illegally members of,
another race.40 The qualifications imposed by the North Carolina jury
selection statutes have long been held to be constitutional by th United
States Supreme Court.
41
A prima facie case of exclusion under the ruling in Norris v. Ala-
banuz (the Scottsboro case) has apparently never been established in
North Carolina. Having one or more of the race allegedly discriminated
against on the jury as finally impanelled tends to cure defects in both
courts. 42 Calling Negroes as tales jurors seems to put the proceeding
in a more impartial light even when none are on the jury as selected.43
A showing in North Carolina that some names of colored persons have
been placed in the jury box seems sufficient evidence on which to base
a finding of no discrimination.4
4
There have been thirteen decisions on the question of racial dis-
crimination in jury selection in North Carolina. Seven of these were
decided in 1947,45 and six of the seven were certified to the United
States Supreme Court. Certiorari has been denied in one; granted in
fiye.
While the evidence of exclusion in the principal case, though elab-
17 N. C. G=x. STAT. (1943) §9-26.
" State v. Levy, 187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924) ; accord, State v. Mallard,
184 N. C. 667, 114 S. E. 17 (1922); State v. Parker, 132 N. C. 101$, 43 S. E.
830 (1903) ; Moore v. Navassa Guano Co., 130 N. C. 229, 41 S. E. 293 (1902) ;
State v. Stanton, 118 N. C. 1182, 24 S. E. 536 (1896) ;- State v. Hensley, 94 N. C.
1021 (1886).
" State v. Speaks. 94 N. C. 873 (1886).
o State v. Sims, 213 N. C. 590, 197 S. E. 176 (1938).
"See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310 (1879).
"' The courts have never specifically so held, but the final result -seems a factor
given much weight. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1944) ; Thomas v. Texas,
212 U. S. 278 (1908) ; State v. Koritz, 227 N. C. 552, 43 S. E. 2d 77 (1947), cert.
denied, - U. S. - , 68 S. Ct. 80, 92 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 22 (1947) ; State
v. Walls, 211 N. C. 487, 191 S. E. 232 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 635 (1937).
Certiorari has been granted in the companion cases which adopted the opinion of
the Koritz case, their only difference being that there were no Negroes on the
juries there as finally constituted. (16 U. S. L. WFxK 3191 [U. S. Dec. 16, 1947]).
If they should be reversed, the factor of Negroes on the jury as finally constituted
would seem established as decisive.
" State v. Lord, 225 N. C. 354, 34 S. E. 2d 205 (1945) ; State v. Walls, 211
N. C. 487, 191 S. E. 232 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 635 (1937).
"'Extreme application in State v. Henderson, 216 N. C. 99, 3 S. E. 2d 357
(1937).
" The currently decided cases aie. set out in note 1 supra.
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orate, is not as strong as that in other North Carolina cases, the jury
commissioners are seemingly traveling a path that is perilously close to
the danger area.
G. L. GRANTHAM, JR.
Criminal Law-Receiving Stolen Goods-Elements in the Crime
In State v. Yow, 1 the defendant was indicted for larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods. The state's evidence tended to show the following:
Prosecuting witness had a pistol stolen from a locked compartment in
his car parked in front of the defendant's sandwich shop. Immediately
previous to the theft, the prosecuting witness had shown the defendant
the pistol, and had thereafter absented himself from his car for a period
of not more than five minutes, during which time the pistol was stolen.
Defendant denied all knowledge of the crime, and promised to aid in
returning the stolen article. Two months later, officers with a search
warrant entered the defendant's home and asked defendant's wife the
location of the pistol. She directed them to a dresser where it was
found unconcealed in the top drawer. The defendant's motion for a non-
suit was denied. The jury acquitted the defendant upon the charge of
larceny, but found him guilty of .receiving stolen goods. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction and held
the non-suit should have been allowed, among other grounds, for in-
sufficient evidence that the defendant received the goods, or if he did,
that he received them with a felonious intent.
It is necessary in order to convict an accused of receiving stolen
goods that the state prove the property was received, that at the time
of receipt it was stolen property, that the receiver knew the property
was stolen, and that his intent in receiving it was felonious.
2
It must be shown that, in fact and in law, the property was stolen
at the time of receipt by the accused.3 If the goods were not stolen,
or were stolen but have since come back into the possession of the
1227 N. C. 585, 42 S. E. 2d 661 (1947). Jiustice Barnhill dissenting without
opinion.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §14-71: Receiving stolen goods: If any person shall
receive any chattel, property, money, valuable security or other things whatso-
ever, the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, either at
common law or by virtue of any statute made or hereafter to be made, such
person knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be indicted and convicted, whether the felon
stealing and taking such chattels, property, money, valuable security or other
thing, shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be
amenable to justice; and any such receiver may be dealt with, indicted, tried and
punished in any county in which he shall have, or shall have had, any such prop-
erty in his possession or in any county in which the thief may be tried, in the
same manner as such receiver may be dealt with, indicted, tried and punished in
the county where he actually received such chattel, money, security, or other
thing; and such receiver shall be punished as one convicted of larceny.
' State v. Shoaf.-68 N. C. 375 (1873).
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owner or his authorized agent, the. defendant does not commit the crime
by receiving them, even though he may believe the property to be
stolen. 4 For this reason, neither. the owner nor the law enforcing offi-
cers may use previously stolen goods for the.purpose of entrapping the
defendant.5 Likewise, the receiver is not guilty of receiving stolen goods
if the original taking of the property was without felonious intent.8
At common law and by the express terms of the statute in this state,
it is necessary that the receiver shall know that the property has been
stolen at the moment he receives it;7 Guilty knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstances of receipt, but it must be established that the
defendant was possessed of either actual or implied knowledge. In
North Carolina guilty knowledge may not be proved by showing that
a reasonably .prudent man would have known the goods received were
stolen, for the test in this jurisdiction is the knowledge of the defendant
alone,s though in many jurisdictions the reasonably prudent man rule
is applied.0 Guilty knowledge may be inferred when the accused pur-
chased the goods at a price considerably less than their value,' 0 or
when other stolen property has been found in his possession." Proof
that he has altered the character of the goods received,' 2 or that he has
committed other similar criminal acts's may also tend to establish the
requisite guilty knowledge. Proof that the accused subscribed to a news-
paper which carried an account of the robbery of goods later found in
his possession was held sufficient to establish scienter.
14
The goods must be received into the possession of the defendant,
but this receipt may be either actual or constructive.' 5 And when the
goods are found in the exclusive dwelling house of the defendant,. this
is evidence to be considered by the jury that they have been received.'8
Sufficient evidence of possession and receipt will be proved if it be shown
that the goods were received by the defendant's agent or servant, or at
his instigation were deposited by the thief in some place directed by
'See Notes, 66 A. L. R. 506 (1930) ; 86 A. L. R. 272 (1933).
United States v. De Bare, 6 Biss. 358, Fed. Cas. No. 14,935.
'Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47 (1873) ; State v. Shoaf, 68 N. C. 375
(1873).7 State v. Barbee, 197 N. C. 248, 148 S. E. 249 (1929) ; State v. Caveness, 78
N. C. 484 (1878).
8 State v. Miller, 212 N. C. 361, 193 S. E. 388 (1937) ; State v. Stathos, 208
X. C. 456, 181 S. E. 273 (1935) ; State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562
(1935).
" State v. Gordon, 105 Minn. 217, 15 Ann. Cas. 899 (1908).10 State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
" Ibid.; State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881).
" State v. Brown, 198 N. C. 41, 150 S. E. 635 (1929).20 State v. Dail, 191 N. C. 231, 131 S. E. 573 (1926); State v. Stancil, 178
N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919) ; State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881).
14 State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
' State v. Johnson, 60 N. C. 236 (1864).
'eIbid.; see State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222, 226 (1877).
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him.17 If the defendant recei'ved the goods from an innocent agent of
the thief, or if he received them from another who previously received
the goods from the thief, under such circumstances that the first receiver
was guilty of the offence, the defendant in this state and by the better
view is guilty of receiving stolen goods.18 It is generally held that the
wife does not commit the offence by receiving from her husband; but
he is not so favored when he receives stolen goods from her.19
Another element which must be proved in the crime of receiving
stolen goods is that the defendant received the stolen property with a
felonious intent,20 and the case will be reversed on appeal if the judge's
instructions fail properly to submit this issue to the jury. It is suffi-
cient to prove the defendant intended to aid the thief, but proof that
the defendant intended to benefit personally by receiving the goods is
not essential.21  If the defendant receives the goods intending to hold
them for reward,22 or to use them in the commigsion of another crime,23
his intent is felonious. Evidence of felonious intent may be found
where the defendant first denies possession of goods later found in his
possession,24 or when he attempts to disguise the goods by changing
their character, 25 or when he is charged with a crime and remains silent
though at liberty to speak.26  Where the defendant was in possession
of stolen goods, and not only failed to explain the possession, but
made contradictory statements concerning how he acquired them,
our court held it was within the province df the jury to determine his
intent.27  However, felonious intent may not be proved from mere
recent possession of stolen goods, as the presumption of guilt arising
from unexplained recent possession, without more, does not extend to
the statutory crime of receiving stolen goods.28  In this state the pre-
sumption arising from recent possession applies only to the offence of
larceny, and therefore, when an indictment charges in one count larceny,
and in the other receiving stolen goods, if the instructions to the jury
17 State v. Weinstein, 224 N. C. 645, 31 S. E.. 2d 920 (1944) ; State v. Stroud,
95 N. C. 626 (1886).
"'MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW, 398 (1934); State v. Cannon, 218 N. C. 466, 11
S. E. 2d 301 (1940) (where defendant received from a forner guilty receivetQ.
CLARIX AND MARSHALL, CaIums, 509 (3rd ed. 1927) ; see, State v. Wilson,
176 N. C. 751, 97 S. E. 496 (1918).
o State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Caveness,
78 N. C. 484 (1878).
21 State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Rushing,
69 N. C. 29, 12 Am. Rep. 641 (1873).2
" Arcia v. State, 26 Tex. App. 193, 9 S. W. 685 (1888).
'3 State v. Dail, 191 N. C. 234, 133 S. E. 574 (1925).
" Birdsong v. State, 120 Ga. 850, 48 S. E. 329 (1904). But see State v.
Oxendine, 223 N. C. 659, 27 S. E. 2d. 814 (1943).
' State v. Worthington, 64 N. C. 594 (1870).
a State v. Brown, 198 N. C. 41, 150 S. E. 635 (1929) ; State v. Dail, 191 N. C.
234, 131 S. E. 574 (1925) ; State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
'7 State v. Conner, 212 N. C. 668, 194 S. E. 291 (1937).
28 State v. Best, 202 N. C. 9, 161 S. E. 535 (1931).
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relate only to the presumption which may arise concerning the first
count, the defendant is entitled to a new trial should he be convicted
solely upon the count of receiving stolen goods.29 If the defendant does
not have knowledge that the goods are stolen,30 or if he receives them
for a lawful purpose such as to return them to the owner,31 he may not
be found to have a felonious intent.
In accord with the practice which is authorized by statute 2 in this
state, the defendant in the principal case was indicted on two counts,
one for larceny, and the other for receiving stolen goods. This pro-
cedure was adopted by our courts as early as 1848, 3 and soon thereafter
the first statute was enacted codifying it. 4
Under this type of indictment the court, in an early case,35 approved
a general verdict of guilty upon several counts; this verdict, of course,
did not specify upon which count the defendant was found guilty. The
court's reasoning was, that in any event, since only one sentence could
be given upon the general verdict, there could be no prejudice to the
defendant. Without modification, this is the law today.81
Both at common law and by the weight of authority, the general
rule is that when a larceny has been committed, the principal thief, that
is the one who is guilty of the actual caption and asportation, cannot
be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving, for the reason that he can-
not receive from himself.37 However, this is not the rule in North
Carolina, for a general verdict of guilty constitutes a distinct and separate
verdict of guilty upon each count,38 and therefore, in this state, a de-
fendant may be found guilty of both crimes. On appeal, the Supreme
Court will sustain the general verdict if there be sufficient evidence to
prove either one of the two counts, for the Court'apparently presumes
that the jury based their verdict upon the good count. In the principal
case the defendant was found guilty of receiving stolen goods but was
acquitted of larceny. Therefore, when the court found there was in-
sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty of receiving stolen goods,
2 State v. Lowe, 204 N. C. 572, 169 S. E. 180 (1933); State v. Adams, 133
N. C. 667, 45 S. E. 553 (1907).
" State v. Oxendine, 223 N. C. 659, 27 S. E. 2d 814 (1943) ; State v. Gaddy,
209 N. C. 34, 182 S. E. 667 (1935) ; State v. Lowe, 204 N. C. 572, 196 S. E. 180(1933).
3 State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Caveness,
78 N. C. 484 (1878).
32 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §15-151: Larceny and receiving: ... The defend-
ant may be charged in the same indictment in several counts with the separate
offenses of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, and larceny."
23 State v. Williams, 31 N. C. 140 (1848).
N. C. REV. CODE of 1855, c. 35, §23.
" State v. Williams, 31 N. C. 140 (1848).
"6 State v. Warren, 228 N. C. 22, 44 S. E. 2d 207 (1947).
37 See Note, 136 A. L. R. 1088 (1942); State v. Worthington, 64"N. C. 594(1870).
"' State v. Cross, 106 N. C. 650, 10 S. E. 854 (1890).
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the defendant was set free. However, under the same set of facts, it
is quite possible that a conviction might have been sustained and the
defendant sent to prison had the jury returned a general verdict as is
the usual practice instead of a special verdict. For if a general verdict
had been rendered, the court would not have been limited to examining
only the evidence in the crime of receiving stolen goods, but would have
been at liberty to consider the evidence presented on the count of lar-
ceny. If the court had found sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt
of larcency, then the general verdict would have been sustained even
though the jury in fact had rendered the verdict upon the count of
receiving stolen goods. Since the crimes are mutually exclusive, it
would seem that the jury should only be allowed to render a special
verdict upon this type of indictment, and that the defendant is prejudiced
by the use of the general verdict. From the standpoint of the prosecu-
tion, the result is a desirable one, for in many cases it is extremely diffi-
cult to determine whether the defendant actually stole the goods or
merely received them.39
In the principal case,40 it is clear that two elements of the crime
were definitely proven. First, that the pistol was stolen, and secondly
that the defendant had knowledge that the pistol was stolen. There-
fore, the only other elements which the state had to prove were that
the defendant received the pistol, and that he did so with a felonious
intent. The Supreme Court apparently decided that the evidence on the
latter two points was insufficient even to go to the jury.
The exercising of any control or dominion over stolen goods is suffi-
cient to constitute receiving, and it is not necessary that there be an
actual manual possession.41 Since there can be no possession without a
previous receipt, proof of possession should be proof of receipt. In
State v. Joh=on,42 proof of possession was established when the goods
were found in the exclusive dwelling house of the defendant, and this
holding received approval in the dictum of a later case.48  Since the
principal case, the court has had before it State v. Warre;,44 in which
a general verdict of guilty of larceny and receiving stolen goods was
upheld. In this case the only evidence that the defendant received the
stolen goods was that they were found hidden in his home, yet apparently
"State v. Carter, 113 N. C. 639, 18 S. E. 517 (1893); State v. Toole, 106
N. C. 736, 11 S. E. 168 (1890); State v. Smiley, 101 N. C. 709, 7 S. E. 904(1888); cf. State v. Major, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 76 (1866); Weisberg v.
United States, 49 App. D. C. 28, 258 Fed. 284 (1919) ; Rex. v. Smith, Dears cc.
494, 196 Eng. Reprint 818 (1855).
" State v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585, 42 S. E. 2d 661 (1947).
4145 Am. JiR.: RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, §3, p. 385.
2 60 N. C. 236 (1864).
"'See State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222, 226 (1877) ; State v. Sherman, 216 N. C.
719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1939).
"228 N. C. 22, 44 S. E. 2d 207 (1947).
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this evidence was found sufficient to prove the defendant received the
goods. Since proof of the element of receiving has seldom been ques-
tioned in this jurisdiction, the court has not had an opportunity to ex-
press itself fully upon this subject. However, in view of past decisions,
it would seem that at least in the present case, there was sufficient evi-
dence to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant had received
the goods.
There was no direct evidence in. the case that the defendant received
the stolen goods with a felonious intent. This left only the question of
whether the circumstances under which the defendant received the goods
were such that his felonious intent might be implied. Since the pre-
sumption which arises from recent possession had no application, the
jury at most was left to conjecture whether the defeidant received the
stolen goods with a felonious intent, or received them for the purpose
of returning the goods to the rightful owner as he had promised to do.
Unquestionably these circumstances alone were not sufficient to imply
that the defendant received the goods with felonious intent, for our Court
has said, "When the act of a person may be attributed to two or more
motives, the one criminal and the other not, the humanity of our law
will ascertain as to that which is not criminal." 45
Granting that in the present case there was insufficient evidence of
felonious intent, would the Supreme Court have arrived at a different
result had the state proved that the defendant had been in possession
of the gun for sufficient length of time to have returned it to the owner ?
THoMAS A. WADDEN, JR.
Damages-Decereased Purchasing Value of the Dollar
As Element-Excessiveness
A federal district court recently sustained a jury verdict awarding
$160,000 to a four-year-old boy for loss of both arms' above the wrist
and elbow respectively in a personal injury action.1 A most interesting
aspect of the case is the importance attached to the decreased. purchasing
value of the dollar by the trial judge in reviewing the award on defend-
ant's motion to set aside as excessive. 2
Although. expressed necessarily in terms of the dollar, the value of
an award of damages is not that dollar itself, but the goods and services
it will purchase. Thus fluctuations in the purchasing value of the dollar.
should be a proper consideration in the measurement of monetary yom-
, State v. Massey, 86 N. C. 658 (1882).
'Armentrant v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S. D. W. Va. 1947).
' Id. at 101 ("In seeking to discover whether or not the jury were actuated
by any improper motives in arriving at the amount of the verdict, we should
attempt to measure the monetary value of the different elements of damage which
were proper for their consideration; bearing in mind the decreased value of the
dollar, which has come about very rapidly during the past few years.').
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pensation. 3 What weight is to be given this factor is indefinite, most
courts merely stating it as one of the numerous factors to be considered.4
It is, of course, a product of the times, varying in importance with
changes in economic conditions, but the long-term downward trend in
the purchasing power of the dollar has been evidenced by almost con-
stant reference by many courts over the last thirty years. 5
The determination of damages in a personal injury action is pri-
marily the province of the jury under proper instructions of the trial
court.6 Most frequently the courts express their reluctance to interfere
by saying that to warrant such interference, the verdict must be so
excessive as to appear that it was given under the influence of passion
or prejudice, or was the result of mistake on the part of the jury.7 In
the principal case the trial judge set out all of the factors which he
thought might properly go into the jury's synthesis, 8 including an un-
usual adjustment for income taxes.9  After mathematically computing
these elements, he concluded that although the verdict was exceptionally
large, the jury might properly have reached such a sum. However, it
seems that the decreased purchasing value of the dollar, which in effect
combined with and inflated each of the other factors, was the prime con-
sideration leading to his justification of the award.
As far back as 1878 a New York appellate court recognized the
changing value of the dollar as pertinent to the ascertainment of dam-
' Although no mention of the decreased purchasing value of the dollar was
found in the North Carolina Reports, this factor undoubtedly has had a degree of
influence through the increase in wages which normally follows the increase in
cost of living and would thus be reflected in the consideration of lost earning
capacity in the measuring of compensation. But cf. Palmer v. Security Trust
Co., 242 Mich. 163. 218 N. W. 677 (1928).
'Delaney v. New York Cent. R. R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ; Cole
v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945); Jones v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Ford v. Fried, 330 Ill.
App. 136, 70 N. E. 2d 626 (1947); Scott v. Claiborne Electric Cooperative,
Inc., - La. App. - , 13 So. 2d 524 (1943) ; Schneller v. Louisiana State Rice
Milling Co., 148 La. 88, 86 So. 663 (1920); Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170,
19 N. W. 2d 327 (1945); Bowers v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., - S. C. - ,
42 S. E. 2d 705 (1947).
' A converse application of this principle has been made to decrease the award
due to an increase in the purchasing value of the dollar. Johnson v. St. Paul City
R. R., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N. W. 900 (1899).
8 McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §16 (1935); PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDICTS 1 (1927).
7 McCoRmicx, DAMAGES §18 (1935); PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDIcrs 2 (1927).
8 The following factors were included: pain, suffering, humiliation, permanent
disfigurement, inconvenierice and incapacity, personal service and care until the
end of maximum expectancy, and loss of earning capacity from the age of 21
until the end of maximum expectancy reduced to present worth. See McCoRMICK,
DAMAGES §§86, 88, 90 (1935).
' Income taxes were computed at the present day rates less 30010 anticipated
reduction in the near future. Thus taxes payable on estimated potential earnings
were deducted yearly and those payable on interest from the principal sum were
added. Cf. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Dehnisch, - Tex. Civ. App. - ,
57 S. W. 64 (1900). Contra: Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82 (C. C. A. 2d
1944) (too conjectural).
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ages.10 As first applied, it was limited merely to the review of damages
by the courts."' Since then it has come to be recognized as proper for
the jury to consider in reaching the verdict in the first instance.' 2  It
has been held error to instruct the jury that it must not assess damages
according to its view of the present purchasing power of the dollar. 3
Moreover, it has been held proper matter for counsel's argument to the
jury to set forth the increased cost of living.14
Probably the most frequently invoked test of the excessiveness or
nonexcessiveness of a particular award is its compatibility with previous
awards in substantially similar factual situations.' 5  The test cannot be
applied with mathematical precision because of the many differing fac-
tors going into an award'6 but the wide experience reflected in awards
given in similar cases is of great value as a guide to what. is reasonable
compensation in the mind of an average man." Thus a Michigan court
stated,' "A general review of the cases in which there are facts of a
somewhat similar character enables one to determine that the amount
of a verdict which does not fall within certain limitations is unjust."
" Gale v. New York C. & H. R. R., 13 Hun 1, 4 (N. Y. 1878) ("But in
making comparison of other cases with the present, we notice two things: one is
that the relative value of money has diminished in recent times; another is that,
generally, in the older parts of the country the relative value of money is less than
in the new.").
21E.g., Louisville & N. R. R. v. Williams, 183 Ala. 136, 62 So. 679 (1913);
Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. Miller, 5 Ga. App. 402, 63 S. E. 299 (1908);
Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 186 Iowa 378, 170 N. W. 461 (1919); Dole v. New
Orleans Ry. and Light Co., 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929 (1908); Hays v. United
R. R., 183 Mo. App. 608, 167 S. W. 656 (1914).
"
2Missouri P. R. R. v. Elvin,, 176 Ark. 737, 4 S. W. 2d 528 (1928);
Washington & R. R. Co. v. La Fourcade, 48 App. D. C. 364 (1919).
" Tennessee River Nay. Co. v. Woodward, 18 Ala. App. 34, 88 So. 364 (1920)(charge that jury should not consider change in purchasing value of dollar did
not correctly state the law); Hannon v. Delaware, L. & W. R. t, 98 N. J. L.
191, 119 Atl. 86 (1922) (jury authorized to award compensation and in doing so
to consider the purchasing power of the standard which was used to express it).
'Washington & R. R. Co. v. La Fourcade, 48 App. D. C. 364 (1919) ; Halloran
v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 AUt. 143 (1921).
"
5 Bennett v. Gillette Motor Transport Co., 59 F. Supp. 475 (W. D. Mo. 1944)(adjudicated cases serve as guideposts) ; Jennings v. Chicago, R.I . & P. Ry., 43 F.
2d 397 (D. Minn. 1930) (keep within bounds of reason and to some extent in
harmony with verdicts in similar cases) ; Szivos v. Leonard, 113 Conn. 522, 155
Atl. 637 (1931); Brook v. Interurban Motor Trans. Co., 156 La. 286, 100 So.
428 (1924); Mississippi R. & L. Co. v. McCormick, 175 Miss. 208, 166 So. 534
(1934) (verdict reduced because far in excess of average verdict for comparable
injury); Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn. App. 1, 71 S. W. 2d 215 (1934). But cf.
Dunstan v. Round Hill Dairy, Inc., 128 Conn. 300, 22 A. 2d 631 (1941). See
Notes, 46 A. L. R. 1230 (1927) ; 102 A. L. R. 1125 (1936).
"Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945);
Reil v. McNaspy, - La. -, 177 So. 393 (1937) ; Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Tulsa v. Black, 186 Okla. 620, 99 P. 2d 891 (1940).
" Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 218, 101 S. E. 415,
423 (1919) (". . . while each case must be determined by its own facts, it is
nevertheless true that the verdicts of other juries, which have been approved by
the courts, represent the common or average judgment of mankind as to the
proper recovery in such cases.").
' Kanieski v. Castantini, 243 Mich. 454, 457, 220 N. W. 722, 723 (1928).
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This has been frequently recognized by the courts both in express state-
ments and by constant reference in the opinions to the amounts allowed
in cases of a similar nature.'0
Other courts go further in expressing this view by stating that when
the facts in other cases are similar to the facts in hand, there should
be a reasonable uniformity as to the amount of damages. ° The justifi-
cation for this rule seems to lie in the leveling of any discriminatory
tendencies on the part of the jury, in enabling the litigants to ascertain
what amount may reasonably be recovered once a cause of action has
been established, and in the promoting of more settlements and compro-
mises out of court.
The practice of resorting to previous cases as a guide to securing
some uniformity in damages would work an injustice without at the
same time considering the decreased value of the dollar.2 ' Recognizing
this, courts ,use the factor of decreased purchasing value to achieve
practical uniformity with other awards which on a strict "dollar and
cents" basis are at considerable variance with the particular case at
hand. Thus previous decisions considered in conjunction with the
shrinldng dollar afford a guide by which a fair standard of damages for
a particular injury may be estimated. 22
A review of past decisiorls reveals only one judgment in personal
injury cases which approaches that of the principal case in size. In
1946'a jury verdict was sustained awarding $165,000 for loss of both
legs.23 In 1943 $100,000 was allowed as compensation for loss of both
legs,24 and in a similar case in 1944 the same award was sustained. 25
Except for these four verdicts in recent years, the average verdict in
cases where the injury was the loss of both arms or both legs has been
far below $100,000.26 Adjustment of the verdicts in twenty-eight such
1 1 PARmrzs, DAMAGE V._DICrS 39 (1927) ; 15 Am. JuR., DAMAGES §207.20Mudrick v. Market Street Ry., 11 Cal. 2d 724, 81 P. 2d 950 (1938);
Hare v. New Amsterdam .Casualty Co., - La. App. -, 1 So. 2d 439 (1942) ;
Ford v. Louisville & N. 1. R., - Mo. - , 196 S. W. 2d 163 (1947);
McNatt v. Wabash Ry., 341 Mo. 516, 108 S. W. 2d 33 (1937).
2 Hurst v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 280 Mo. 566, 219 S. W. 566 (1920).2 E.g., Brown v. Boehn, - Cal. 2d -, 178 P. 2d 49 (1947); Cooksey v.
Atchison, T. & S. F." Ry., - Cal. 2d - , 178 P. 2d 69 (1947) ; Noyes v. Des
Moines Club, 186 Iowa 378, 170 N. W. 461 (1919) ; Eleazar v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
La. App. -, 24 So. 2d 387 (1946); Valley v. Scott, 126 Me. 597, 138
AUt. 311 (1927); Rhineberger v. Thompson, - Mo. - , 202 S. W. 2d 64(1947); Cook v. Union Electric Supply Co., - R. I. -, 133 At. 345 (1926);
National Fruit Product Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S. E. 2d 757 (1946) ; Sher-
rill v. Olympic Ice Cream Co., 135 Wash. 99, 237 Pac. 14 (1925).
"
3Delaney v. New York Cent. R. R., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1946)(considered depreciation of money at the present time).
" Advance v. Thompson, 320 111. App. 406, 51 N. E. 2d 334 (1943) (considered
depreciation of money in reducing the verdict from $125,000 to $100,000).
"
5McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., 57 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. N. Y. 1944)
(reduced from $130,000).2 Caldwell v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 955 (S. D. Cal. 1947) ($40,150);
Ellis v. Scandrett, 28 F. Supp. 16 (D. Idaho 1940) ($40,000) ; Dunton v. Hines,
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cases2 7 from 1914 to date to a common base by use of the Department
of Labor statistics on the cost of living reveals that the average amount
of the verdicts so adjusted is approximately $40,000. Further corrected
to the present .day cost of living,2 8 this average adjusted award would
stand at $63,000, an amount some 2Y2 times smaller than the award
sustained. The test of uniformity certainly was not met.
While no statistics are entirely reliable, it would seem that the in-
creased availability and extensiveness of impartial government statistics
would afford a better guide for the adjustment of past verdicts to the
increased cost of living than would the personal observations of the
individual judge.28' Although the judge in the instant case did refer to
these statistics as justifying the award, he failed to utilize them in a
comparison with other verdicts. The award here sustained through
267 Fed. 452 (D. Me. 1920) ($30,000); Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark.
14 121 S. W. 2d 877 (1938) ($45,000); Chicago, R. L & Pac. Ry. v.
Womble, 131 Ark. 411, 199 S. W. 81 (1917) ($25,000); Mudrick v. Market Street
Ry., 11 Cal. 2d 724, 81 P. 2d 950 (1938) ($42,500); 'Howard v. Baltimore &
0. C. T. R. R, 327 Ill. App. 83, 63 N. E. 2d 724 (1945) ($50,000) ; Popp v.
Terminal k. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 316 Ill. App. 670, 45 N. E. 2d 298 (1943)
($45,000) ; Gourle'y v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 295 Ill. App. 160, 14. N. E. 2d
842 (1938) ($60,000) ; Chicago, I. & L. Ry.. v. Stierwalt, 87 Ind. App. 478,
153 N. E. 807 (1926) ($42,000); Southern Ry. v. Dugless, 169 Ky. 360, 183
S. W. 937 (1916) ($15,000); Nashville, C. & S. R. R. v. Banks, 168 Ky. 579,
182 S. W. 660 (1916) ($16,500) ; Leininger v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 150
La. 1089, 91 So. 521 (1922) ($25,000) ; Prince v. Maine Cent R. R., 122 Me.
130, 119 At. 192 (1922) ($29,965); Carlson v. Payne, 150 Minn. 480, 186 N. W.
291 (1922) ($45,000); McMahon v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 127 Minn. 1, 148
N. W. 446 (1914) ($39,000); Aly v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo.
1116 119 S. W. 2d 363 (1938) ($40,000); Turnbow v. Kansas City Rys., 277
Mo. 644, 211 S. W. 41 (1919) ($25,000) ; Fried v. New York N. H. & H. R. R.,
183 App. Div. 115, 170 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1918), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 619, 130
N. E. 917 (1921) ($55,000) ; Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I. Ry., 268 Mo. 31,
186 S. W. 1035 (1916), aff'd, 243 U. S. 311 (1916) ($25,000); Palmer v. Security
Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N. W. 677 (1928) ($74,000 so excessive as to re-
quire a new trial); McKeon v. Delaware L: & W. R. R., 100 N. J. L. 258,
127 Atl. 34 (1924) ($50,000); Beam v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 77 Ohio
App. 419, 68 N. E. 2d 159 (1947) ($75,000); Toledo, C. & 0. R. R. v. Miller,
108 Ohio St. 388, 140 N. E. 617 (1923) ($75,000) ; Kurn v. Campbell, 188 Okla.
636, 112 P. 2d 386 (1942) ($25,700); Dumphy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 82
W. Va. 123, 95 S. E. 863 (1918) ($30,000).2 TThe cases cited notes 24, 25, and 26 supra were those adjusted. Each verdict
was adjusted by dividing the index number of the corresponding year as set out
in the Consumers' Price Index into the amount of the award. By this means the
verdicts may be compared as of a common base at 1935-1936 - 100. See Monthly
Labor Review, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Oct. 1947, p. 510 Table D-1; Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics, 1947 Govern-
ment Statistics Bureau of Washington, D. C., Consumers' Price Index, pp. 102-103.
"' As of July, 1947.
.8 This raises the collateral question of introduction of statistics in the trial
court. In Bell v. First Naiiow- Life Ins. Co., - La. App. - , 141 So. 484
(1932), the court, in refusing statistics offered by counsel, said, "We are con-
vinced that we should take judicial cognizance of the fact that there has been an
advance in the purchasing power of money, but cannot accept the figures which
may have been arrived at by -writers in trade journals, particularly when the
reputation and standing of these writers have not been proven nor the journals
offered in evidence.'
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consideration of the decreased purchasing power of the dollar is thus
greatly larger in proportion to other verdicts in similar cases than the
increased cost of living would seem to justify.29
ROBERT G. STOCKTON.
Domestic Relations-Parent and Child-Support of
Incompetent Adult
Plaintiff, wife of the defendant, brought suit against him to recover
the value of necessaries and necessary services furnished by her to their
adult son. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant husband had separated
himself from his family, that the son continued to live with the plaintiff,
his mother, before reaching majority and thereafter, and that before
and after attaining majority he was insolvent, unmarried, and so men-
tally and physically handicapped as to be incapable of supporting him-
self. On demurrer, held: a good cause of action was stated.'
Under the English and earlier American view, the parent's obliga-
tion to support his minor child was a moral one only.2  The prevailing
view in this country now, however, is that there is a legal as well as
moral duty of support resting on the parent.3 While the common law
duty is widely recognized, the basis and reasoning upon which it has
been founded have varied greatly. Some courts have imposed the duty
of support as a reciprocal of the parent's right to the custody, control
and earnings of the minor child ;4 others have found a basis in the in-
"9 The fact that on a previous trial of this same case, reversed on appeal, the
jury awarded only $100,000 would also point to the conclusion that an award of
$160,000 was excessive.
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
'Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 481 (Exch. 1841); Shelton v. Springett, 11
C. B. 452 (1851); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187 (1870); Freeman v. Robinson,
38 N. J. L. 383, 20 Am. Rep. 399 (1876).
3 1 ScnouzLER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §787 (6th ed. 1921); MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATiONS §110 (1931).
The North Carolina court early recognized a legal duty on the father to main-
tain his children, even when they had separate estates of their own. Walker v.
Crowder, 37 N. C. 478 (1843) ; Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 345 (1872). The
duty is not an absolute one, however. It is qualified by the parent's ability.
Casualty Co. v. Lawing, 225 N. C. 103, 33 S. E. 2d 609 (1945).
The duty of support is limited to necessaries, what constitutes necessaries
varying with the circumstances of the particular case. The liability is enforced
under several principles: an agency implied in law, an agency implied in fact,
or quasi-contract, the North Carolina court adopting the latter. See Howell v.
Solomon, 167 N. C. 588, 592, 83 S. E. 619, 621 (1914).
The duty of support is now generally covered by criminal statutes also. See
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§14-322 through 14-325..
' Central Asylum v. Knighton, 113 Ky. 156, 67 S. W. 366 (1902) ; Dedham v.
Natick, 16 Mass. 140 (1819); Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 729
(1895); Butler v. Commonvealth, 132 Va. 609, 110 S. E. 868 (1922). Right to
custody and earnings does not form a satisfactory basis for the duty, however,
since the duty of support must still remain on the father even though custody of the
child has been awarded the mother or third persons. Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md.
254, 67 Atl. 132 (1907); see Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490,
491 (1914).
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ability of the child to care for himself 5 and the state's interest as parens
patriae.0 The state's concern in preventing the child from becoming a
pauper and a charge upon the taxpayer is said by some to warrant the
imposition of the duty;7 and still others, including the North Carolina
court, have taken the view that the obligation springs from the natural
relationship of parent to child, a responsibility arising from the fact
of parenthood alone.8
Having recognized the existence of the legal duty owed by parent
to child, the North Carolina court has not confined enforcement of the
duty to actions by third parties who have furnished necessaries, or to
divorce decrees or criminal actions. Instead, a progressive attitude has
been taken; the obligation has been directly sanctioned by allowing the
child himself to proceed directly against the parent.0 Such direct en-
forcement would seem to be equally available to illegitimate children.
against the putative father.1
The common law duty of support owed to the child ordinarily termi-
nates (1) upon the attainment of majority,11 (2) when there has other-
wise been an emancipation, 12 or (3) upon the death of either parent or
'Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890); Doughty v. Engler,
112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E.
426 (1938).2Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N. W. 778 (1918).
' Willitts v. Willitts, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379 (1916).
'Barritt v. Barritt, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934); Doughty v. Engler,
112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; Buckminster v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am.
Dec. 652 (1865). "The duty of parents to provide for the naintenance of their
children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf, (b) laid on
them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them
into the world ... ." 1 CooLEY's BLACXSTONE 446 (3rd ed. 1884).
Thayer v. Thayer, .189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E. 553 (1925) (natural obligation to
support illegitimate children is sufficient consideration to uphold express promise
to furnish necessaries) ; Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 317, 83 S. E. 490 (1914)
(legal, natural and moral duty to support minor children irrespective of loss of
custody); Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 153, 55 S. E. 71 (1906) (father under
natural obligation to support illegitimate children) ; Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N. C.
71 (1827) (natural duty of support extends to illegitimates).
Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936); Note, 15 N. C. L. Rv.
67 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313 (1936).
The weight of authority, however, is apparently contra. Rawlings v. Rawlings,
121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146 (1919) ; Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891) ; Glaze
v. Hart, 225 Mo. App. 1205, 36 S. W. 2d 684 (1931) ; Allings v. Allings, 52 N. J.
Eq. 92, 97 Atl. 655 (1893).
"o Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; cf. Hyatt v. McCoy,
195 N. C. 762, 143 S. E. 518 (1928) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E.
553 (1925) ; see Burton v. Belvin, 142 N. C. 151, 153, 55 S. E. 71, 72 (1906)
Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N. C. 71, 75 (1827).
Humboldt County v. Beigger, 232 Iowa 494, 4 N. E. 2d 422 (1942) ; Breuer
v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135
Al. 841 (1927); Brown v. Ramsay, 29 N. J. L. 117 (1860); re Beilstein, 145
Ohio St. 397, 62 N. E. 2d 205 (1945) ; Lind v. Zeisel, 159 N. E. 849 (Ohio App.
1927).
2Emancipation may be either partial or complete; but it is only in complete
emancipation that all rights and duties of the parent-child relationship are ex-
tinguished. Note, 28 MINN. L. REv. 275 (1944). Where there has not been a
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child.13 The principal case, however, constitutes an exception to the
"majority" rule. Under the doctrine of this and supporting cases, if at
the time of attaining majority the child is mentally or physically in-
capable of self-support, the obligation upon the parent does not terminate
but continiies as long as the necessity for support exists.14 The court
recognizes that majority is a status rather than an inflexible rule of
substantive law conferring vested rights. Since the decision may not
be rationalized under the rules of emancipation, the North Carolina
court properly chose to place it upon public policy. In the final analysis,
the question becomes-shall the parent be legally bound to support his
incapacitated adult child or shall that duty devolve upon the taxpayers if
the parent chooses to ignore his moral obligation? Consistent with the
theory that parental duty springs from and is a responsibility of parent-
hood, the North Carolina court has placed the burden upon the parent.
North Carolina has no statute making parents liable to the state or
county for the maintenance furnished to adult incompetents. 15 Under
complete emancipation, i.e. where there has not been an assent by both parties, the
act or assent of one party alone cannot absolve that party of the duties upon him.
Thus in Hunycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628 (1912) it was held
that the act of the father in driving his minor son from home might result in
emancipation as to the child but did not free the father of the duty of support.
Assent need not be express; it may be implied from circumstances. James v.
James,.226 N. C. 399, 38 S. E. 2d 168 (1946) ; Jolly v. Telegraph Co., 204 N. C.
136, 167 S. E. 575 (1933), reh. denied, 205 N. C. 108, 170 S. E. 145 (1933);
Lowrie v. Oxendine, 153 N. C. 267, 69 S. E. 131 (1910); Ingram v. R. R., 152
N. C. 762, 67 S. E. 926 (1910). Exceptions to the rule requiring mutual assent
for complete emancipation are marriage and enlistment in the armed services. Com-
plete emancipation occurs here because of the inconsistency of the parent-child
relationship with the new relationship entered into by the child.
" Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 Atl. 841 (1927) ; Rice v. Andrews, 217
N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926) ; Comment, 25 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1926); see Stone v.
Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 189, 134 Pac. 820, 822 (1913) (the court questioned the
termination of the common law duty by death as a matter of public policy and held
a divorce decree providing for maintenance was binding upon the father's estate).
That a father may disinherit his child and leave him to become a charge upon
the State has been severely criticized. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
§115 (1931).
" Freestate v. Freestate, 244 Ill. App. 166 (1927) ; Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky.
12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925) ; Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (1908) ;
Comm. v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. 232, 161 Atl. 883 (1932) ; Rowell v. Town of
Vershire, 62 Vt. 405, 19 Atl. 990 (1890) ; Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co.,
111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920); see Borchert v. Borchert, 45 A. 2d 463,
465 (Md. 1946); re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N. E. 2d 205, 207 (1945);
Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 Atl. 549, 553 (1930).
New York has apparently imposed a common law duty to support incapacitated
adult children notwithstanding that they did not become incapable of self-support
until after attaining majority. In re Van Denburgh, 178 App. Div. 237, 164 N. Y.
Supp. 966 (1917); Alger v. Miller, 56 Barb. 227 (N. Y. 1868); Cromwell v.
Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558 (N. Y. 1863).
" The duty to support adult incompetents apparently exists only as between
husband and wife in North Carolina.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §122-46 provides that' the clerk of superior court
may commit a mentally disordered, epileptic, or person addicted to the use of
drugs or alcohol to the State Hospital under a certificate of indigency where such
person has no estate or property "nor has any one such property who is liable
for his maintenance under §35-33 of the General Statutes." By §35-33 it is pro-
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the holding of the principal case, however, the state or county would
seem to have a recoverable claim, for necessaries furnished, against the
parent of any inmate of a state or county hospital or asylum when such
inmate was incapacitated upon reaching majority.16 But where the
adult child became incapacitated after having attained majority, the duty
of support, having once terminated, is not revived; and accordingly no
recovery could be had.17
In the principal case, the court, in creating the exception to the
"majority" rule, reached a result. commensurate with sound public policy
and progressive social principles. Would an extension of that exception
to include a parental duty of support embracing all incapacitated adult
children who would become a charge upon the taxpayers be desirable?
Only one state has apparently extended the common law duty of sup-
port to that extreme.' 8 The better solution seems to lie in the enactment
of so-called "poor laws." In substance these provide that the father,
mother, grandfather, grandmother or children, in that order, of any old
or incapacitated indigent person shall maintain them if of ability to do
so.19 Such a statute would seem to be consistent with North Carolina
policy as enunciated in the cases and would properly place the burden
of maintenance upon those more equitably able to bear it than the
taxpayers.
AUGUST L. MEYLAND, JR.
vided that the clerk shall inquire whether the inebriate is indigent and if he so
finds he shall then inquire whether or not the petitioning wife or husband or if
the inebriate is a minor whether the parent has sufficient estate to bear the cost
of maintenance; if sufficient estate is found the clerk shall order payment there-
from; if not, payment shall be made by the county from which committed.See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§143-120 through 125.
"Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S. W. 541 (1925). But cf. Porter v.
Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890) (distinguishable on the ground that
only a partial and not a complete emancipation was achieved). See Wells v.
Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 619, 44 S. E. 2d 31, 35 (1947).
" In re Van Denburgh, 179 App. Div. 237, 164 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1917) ; Alger
v. Miller, 56 Barb. 227 (N. Y. 1868); Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558
(N. Y. 1863). The matter is now covered by statute, N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW
§101, providing: "The husband, wife, father, mother, grandparent, or child- of a
recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need
thereof shall, if of sufficient ability, be responsible for the support of such
person ...
" "Poor laws" in general are patterned after 43 Eliz. c. 2 (1601).
Substantially similar statutes are found in a majority of the states. See ALA.
CODE (1940) tit. 44, §8; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §7603; CAL. CIV. CODE(Deering, 1941) §206; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 124, §1; CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) §1717; GA. CODE'ANN. (Park, 1936) §2301; IDAHo CODE (1932)§31-1002; ILL. ANN. STAT.'(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 107, §1; IOWA CODE (1946)§252.2; ME. REV. STAT. (1944) c. 82, §20; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1942) c. 117, §6;
MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §16.122; MINN. STAT.. (Henderson, 1941)§261.01; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942)- §7357; MONT. REv. CODE (Darlington, Supp.
1939) §4522; NEB. REv. STAT. (1943) §68-101; N. H. Rav. LAWS (1942) c. 124,
§18; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) §44:1-140; N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW §101;
N. D. 'REv. STAT. (1943) §50-0119; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) tit. 10, §12; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 62, §195; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §91-0-1; VT.
Pur. LAWS (1933) §3937; WAsn. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1933) §9982:
W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) §626(150).
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Evidence-Witness~s-Competency of Husband and Wife
in Criminal Conversation Action
In a recent North Carolina case' a wife brought an action against
a feme defendant to recover damages for criminal conversation by
defendant with plaintiff's husband. Over objection, testimony by plain-
tiff relative to statements made to her by her husband tending to show
his illicit relationship with defendant was admitted. Held: Under mod-
em Married Woman's Statutes2 a wife can bring the action of criminal
conversation. Under the North Carolina statute governing competency
of husband and wife in civil actions, the admission of the testimony
relating to the husband's statements was error.
The case is one of first impression in North Carolina on the direct
question of the right of a wife to sue for criminal conversation. The
North Carolina Supreme Court had previously recognized this right in
a well-reasoned dictum in the case of Hinnant v. Tidewater Power
Company.4 The court in allowing the action in the instant case followed
what is a definite majority holding on this question.5
This decision, being on a question of first impression, suggests an
examination of the evidence statute here involved with some degree of
care.6 Passed in 1866, the statute abolished the common-law rule that
for centuries had made husband and wife incompetent as witnesses for
and against each other.7 But the abolition was not complete, for two
areas of incompetency were retained, one of them being "... any action
or proceeding for or on account of criminal conversation." Within this
area of incompetency, however, there is embodied an exception, vL-.,
that in actions of criminal conversation brought by the husband
in which the character of the wife is assailed she shall be a competent
witness to testify in refutation of such charges." It is this portion of
the statute, appearing as an amendment in 1919, with which this note
is primarily concerned."
'Knighten v. McLain, 227 N. C. 682, 44 S. E. 2d 79 (1947).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§52-1, 52-6, 52-10.
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1945) §8-56.
'189 N. C. 120, 122, 126 S. E. 307, 309 (1925).
5 See cases collected in 27 Am. Julus., HUSBAND AND WIFE, §535 (1944).6 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1945) §8-56: "In any trial . .. the husband or wife
of any party thereto, or of any person in whose behalf any such suit . . . is
brought, . . . shall, except as herein stated, be competent and compellable to give
evidence, as any other witness on behalf of any party to such suit, action or pro-
ceeding. Nothing herein shall render any husband or wife competent or com-
pellable to give evidence for or against the other in any action for or in con-
sequence of adultery, or in any action or proceeding for divorce on account of
adultery; or in any action or proceeding for or on account of criminal conversa-
tion, except that in actions of criminal conversation brought by the husband in
which the character of the wife is assailed she shall be a competent witness to
testify in refutation of such charges: Provided however, that in all such actions
or proceedings, the husband or wife shall be competent to prove and may be
required to prove, the fact of marriage."
Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 71 S. E. 1087 (1911).Public Laws 1919, c. 18.
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Application of the statute in this area of incompetency has led to
certain incongruities. The declaration of incompetency has been applied
to make inadmissible indirect, as well as direct, testimony of the wife,
including declarations and admissions relating to the offense itself. It
has not applied to testimony of the plaintiff husband relating to the mis-
conduct of his wife, since she is not a party and he is not deemed to be
testifying "for or against" her.'0 The provision making the wife com-
petent to testify in refutation of charges against her character has been
applied in only one North Carolina case." "The net result is that the
wife's testimony and declarations cannot be used to establish her im-
proper relations with the defendant, but that in all other respects the
husband and wife are as competent in an action of criminal conversation
as in any other case ' 1
2
The advent of the action by the wife in the principal case focuses
attention on a new incongruity in the statute itself. Is there not injustice
in failure to provide that the husband can testify in refutation of charges
brought by the wife against his character? Will the courts remedy this
injustice by interpretation? There appears in the statute governing
competency of husband and wife in criminal cases a similar discrepancy
in the rights of the husband and wife to testify'3 which the courts have
disposed of. In an exception to incompetency against one's spouse, the
statute provides only forthe right of the wife to testify for the state
in criminal prosecutions of the husband for assault and battery upon
her, but since this was only declaratory of the common-law (which
included a right in both the husband and the wife in such a case) 14 the
court was able to permit a husband to testify in behalf of the state in a
criminal prosecution of his wife for assault and battery upon him.15
But the reasoning by which this right was so extended without express
statutory expression 16 is not applicable in the provision as to criminal
'McCall v. Galloway, 162 N. C. 353, 78 N. E. 429 (1913) ; Gardner v. Klutts,
53 N. C. 375, 376 (1861) (considering common-law prohibition generally the court
said, "It follows that [spouses'] declarations cannot be evidence for or against
[the other], otherwise, more weight is given to what she says when not on oath
than to what she would say on oath; which is absurd.").
10 Powell v. Strickland, 163 N. C. 393, 397, 79 S. E. 872, 874 (1913) ... she
is not a party to the record and has no legal interest in the action or its event,
that is, no interest that can by the rules of law be affected thereby.").
"Chestnutt v. Sutton, 204 N. C. 476, 168 S. E. 680 (1933).
"
2 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §58 (1946).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §8-57: ". . -. Nothing herein shall render any hus-
band or wife competent or compellable to give evidence against each other in any
criminal action or proceeding, . . . except that in all criminal prosecutions of a
husband for an assault and battery upon his wife, . . . it shall be lawful to examine
the wife in behalf of the state against her husband."14 State v. Hussey, 44 N. C. 123 (1852).
10 State v. French, 203 N. C. 632, 166 S. E. 747 (1932); State v. Alderman,
182 N. C. 917, 110 S. E. 59 (1921) ; State v. Davidson, 77 N. C. 522 (1877).1 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §59 n. 62 (1946) ("The competency*
of husband or wife in this type of action was recognized at common law, and
therefore is properly recognized under the statute which was intended to enlarge
and not restrict the common-law.").
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conversation which we are now examining. The common-law rule of
incompetency extended to actions of criminal conversation too,'7 thus
making the provision under consideration in derogation of the common-
law. Statutes in derogation of the common-law will be construed strictly
and not be extended beyond the scope of the legislative expression.18
Since it is assumed that it will be left up to the legislature to remedy
this injustice, this should be accomplished with little difficulty unless
there is some compelling reason for the omission. The cases are devoid
of any language indicating any reason for it. Did the legislature con-
template the present action when it passed the amendment? Most of
the jurisdictions that had passed on the question of the wife's right in
this action had recognized it.10 The North Carolina court had indicated
its attitude toward a wife's right to bring an action for invasion of her
marital rights in the husband. The outmoded idea that the male is
the aggressor, thus negativing his right to refute charges against his
character arising from his own action, was surely not in the minds of
the legislators.
The clue probably appears in a case where a husband was suing for
crimnal conversation, in which the court deplored the fact that the
statute denied the right of the wife to take the stand when her character
was so seriously assailed.21 There the court refused to follow the hold-
ing in divorce cases,2 2 which permitted the wife to testify in refutation
of charges brought by her husband in an action for divorce on grounds
of adultery, despite the omission of such a right in the statute. It is
most probable that the court's statements in that case provided the
impetus for the amendment to the statute and that the legislature, follow-
ing the language used there, never contemplated an action by the wife.
Examination of the statutes of other states casts little light on this
problem as they are so variant in their terms and phraseology that inter-
pretations of them give no real basis of comparison. But it is inter-
esting to note that of the ten states in the United States that have crim-
inal conversation as an exception (some as exception to competency,
1 Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 71 S. E. 1087 (1911).
Is CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §248 (1940); see Price v. Edwards,
178 N. C. 493, 101 S. E. 33 (1919) ; Rice v. Keith, 63 N. C. 319 (1868).
29See Note, 4 A. L. R. 569 (1919).
"0 Brown v. Brown, 121 N. C. 8, 27 S. E. 998 (1897) (alienation of affections).
21 Grant v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 15, 17, 71 S. E. 1087, 1089 (1911) ("The rule
denying the right to the wife to be heard when her character is so seriously assailed
seems cruel, but we cannot permit this consideration to induce us to refuse to
give effect to the legislative act. She was offered as a witness against her hus-
band in an action on account of criminal conversation and this the statute says
cannot be done.").
22 Broom v. Broom, 130 N. C. 562, 565, 41 S. E. 673, 674 (1902) ("Her evi-
dence was in defense of herself, and not 'for or against' the other party, and the
statute disqualifies neither.as a witness in his or her own behalf, except only when
it is for or against the other.").
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others as exception to incompetency strangely enough) in the statutes
governing competency of the husband and wife as witnesses in civil
cases,23 only three2 4 make any distinction between testimony of the wife
and husband. In these three jurisdictions, only two cases have been
found which consider the possible reason for the distinction between
wife and husband. In Pennsylvania the court said, "Doubtless the
legislature considered there were good reasons for permitting the wife
to defend her character and conduct, but no sufficient reason for chang-
ing the common-law rule as .to the husband. '25  One New York court
made an interesting observation on their provision making the wife
competent for the defendant but not for the plaintiff, in actions for
criminal conversation, "The purpose of exclusion of wife as witness for
plaintiff, in actions for criminal conversation is to prevent collusion be-
tween husband and wife. If this is the purpose why should not the
husband also be disqualified if such an action will lie in behalf of the
wife? Is not this section in fact a legislative declaration that such an
action will not lie in behalf of the wife ?"26 The New York Court of
Appeals repudiated this reasoning in a later decision 7 in which the wife
was allowed to sue for criminal conversation. It is also interesting to
note that of these ten states, three have abolished the action of criminal
23 Criminal conversation as exception to competency generally: IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1933) §1720 (husband competent, wife not competent in suit for
seduction of wife); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:97-9 (husband and wife not
compellable in this action); N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT (1947) §439 (wife competent
for defendant but not for plaintiff in this action).
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency for or against:' PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, §319 (wife can testify in refutation of charges
against her character).
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency for or against without con-
sent of other: ARiz. CoDE (1939) c. 23, §103; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering,
1946) §1881; N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §31-0102; S. D. CoDE (1939) §36-0101.
Criminal conversation as exception to incompetency against the other: NEB.
Rv. STAT. (1943) §25-1203 (either may be witness against the other in this
action) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1945) §3-2605 (wife competent against
husband in this action).
" New York: In any action for criminal conversation plaintiff's wife is not a
competent witness for plaintiff, but she is competent for defendant as to any matter
in controversy.
Pennsylvania: In all civil actions brought by husband, the wife shall be a com-
petent witness in rebuttal when her character or conduct is attacked upon the trial
thereof.
Wyoming: Husband and wife can be a witness for each other in all cases,
but not against. The wife can be a witness against the husband in an action for
criminal conversation.2 5 Ehrhart v. Bear, 51 Pa. Super. 39, 45 (1912).
"Strock v. Russell, - Misc. - , 132 N. Y. Supp. 968, 970 (1911); Oppen-
heim v. Kridel, - Misc. - , 198 N. Y. Supp. 157 (1923).
' Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 160, 140 N. E. 227, 231 (1923) ("Sec-
tion 349 of the Civil Practice Act [giving only the wife the right to testify for
defendant in a criminal conversation action] does not express any legislative in-
tent regarding this question [right of wife to bring criminal conversation action].
That provision simply declares a rule of evidence.").
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conversation by statute.28 As in North Carolina, the statutes of the
three states which contain a discrepancy similar to the one under con-
sideration were passed prior to recognition of a wife's right to bring
the action.2
Since the problem is one for the legislature, it is submitted that the
incompetency of husband and wife in criminal conversation cases ought
to be completely abolished. Fifteen states have expressly abolished by
statute the incompetency rule in its entirety30 The jurisdictions that
allow husband and Wife to testify for the other in all actions (whether
or not they have extended the right to testify against) have found no
upsetting situation in allowing the testimony in criminal conversation
cases.-3 The stage is set in North Carolina for another step toward a
complete abolition of incompetency. Maintaining this exception to
complete competency has created a greater anomaly in the law than the
old incompetency rule. Where the husband has joined with an action
for criminal conversation one for alienation of affections (as is usually
the case), burdensome problems present themselves as to admission of
evidence. The court has been compelled to instruct the jury that testi-
mony of the wife tending to show her relationship with defendant is
allowed, but can only be considered with reference to the latter charge.32
Plaintiff is permitted to present indirect testimony (declarations) of the
spouse tending to show the state of mind and feeling between himself
and his wife and the effect of the conduct of the defendant on them.38
Thus the jury, hfter listening to all this testimony, is burdened with the
task of making complicated distinctions that human nature practically
precludes.
'IN. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:39A-1; N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (1947) §§61 (a)
and (i); Wyo. Comp. STAT. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1945) §§3-512 and 3-513.
"9 New York:- L. 1877, c. 416, §184 (first recognized wife's right in crimlnal
conversation action in Oppenheim v. Kridel, supra, 1923).
Pennsylvania: 1907, May 8, P. L. 184, §1 (no case on wife's right in criminal
conversation action).
Wyoming: Laws 1899, c. 81, §1 (no case on wife's right in criminal conversation
action).
1Dat.. mRv. CODE (1935) §4691; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) §90.04; ILL. ANN.
STAT. (Smith Hurd, 1941) c. 51, §5; ME. REv. STAT. (1944) C. 100, §115; MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS (Flack, 1939) art. 35, §1; Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. (1942)
§1892; N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 392, §29; Onio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
1939) §11493; S. C. CODE (1942) §3692; TENN. ANN. CODE (Williams, 1934)
§9777; TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3715; VT. PuBaic LAWS
(1933) §1697; VA. CODE (Michie et al., 1942) §6210; W. VA. CODE (Michie et al.,
1943) §5727; Wis. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §325.18.
"1 Smith v. Meyers, 54 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277 (1898); Phelps v. Utley, 92 Vt.
40. 101 At. 1011 (1917).2 Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N. C. 760, 140 S. E. 807 (1927).
"Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 769 (1920) (an action for crim-
inal conversation and alienation of affections-plaintiff's wife's declarations as to
why she was not going back to plaintiff was held to be part of the res gestae.
The court said at p. 432, "We recognize the danger of evidence of this kind and
the opportunity it affords for collusion and for this reason it should be kept
within bounds With instructions [to the jury] as to how it should be consid-
ered....").
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Unless there is some compelling need for this area of incompetency
supported by stronger reasons than those given for the common-law
rule,34 it should be eliminated from the statute books. A reason pre-
sented by the court is to avoid "fraud and collusion."35 This was one
of the reasons noted for the common-law rule which has been discarded
for all other cases except this and divorce proceedings, and there is no
more danger of collusion here than in other cases. Actually there is
less danger considering the delicacy of the testimony, which no one
is prone to divulge even if true, ". . . and the interest of the state in
the marriage relation, which may justify extreme measures to prevent
collusion in divorce litigation is no excuse for a rule of incompetency
in criminal conversation actions."3 6 In fact one jurisdiction, in a case
of criminal conversation presented at a time when the wife was gen-
erally incompetent as a witness for or against her husband, has held
that a wife should be allowed to testify for the husband in this action
on grounds of public policy.37 At a time when speedy and accurate
administration of justice has become the watchword, this change is in
order.
R. W. BRADLEY, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-State Statutes Enlarging Federal Equity
Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of Equitable Remedial Rights
Solely on a basis of diversity of citizenship a simple contract creditor
entered a federal court in Wisconsin and asked for a receiver. By prin-
ciples of old English Chancery as applied by the federal courts the plain-
tiff would not have been entitled to such relief until it had exhausted
its remedies at law. On the other hand, under the Wisconsin "Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act" the plaintiff was entitled to the relief.1
Held: Defendant's motion to dismiss denied.2
Under a similar set of facts in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen the
United States Supreme Court reversed an order appointing a receiver
Powell v. Strickland, 163 N. C. 393, 400, 79 S. E. 872, 875 (1913)
... whether it was upon the ground of interest alone, when the testimony is in
favor of the spouse, or marital bias, or public policy when it is against, or whether
it was because they were considered as two souls in a single body....").
"See note 31 supra.
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §58 n. 42 (1946).
" Coy v. Humphries, 142 Mo. App. 92, - , 125 S. W. 877, 879 (1910) ("All
power should be given to society to punish those moral ulcers on the body politic
which corrupt its vitals and demoralize its members; and unless society shall
apply sufficient remedies to repress the erotic mania displayed in this case [defend-
ant enticed a wife into adultery] its most cherished and priceless institutions-
home and the family-will be destroyed. The admission of testimony of the wife
for the plaintiff was not error.").
'WIs. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §242.10.
'Houseware Sales Corp. v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747 (E. D.
Wis. 1947).
'261 U. S. 491 (1923). See Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 193 (1923).
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for want of equity jurisdiction.4 The opinion in that case restated the
doctrine of equitable remedial rights, to wit, that a remedial right to
proceed in a federal court sitting in equity can be neither enlarged
nor narrowed6 by state law.7
In the instant case, Judge Duffy, with remarkable candor, faced the
issue of whether the doctrine of equitable remedial rights in the Pusey
case is still the law after Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.8 Although he recog-
nized that the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York9 did not expressly
over rule Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen, Judge Duffy concluded: The
"attitude of the Supreme Court" appears to be "that as far as possible
in shaping relief federal courts should conform to the laws of the State
where suit is brought in a diversity of citizenship case."'1
Soon after the formulation" of the doctrine of equitable remedial
rights the Supreme Court created a mode of circumventing that doctrine
-where desirable to reach a particular result. The Court laid down the
rule that although the states may neither enlarge nor narrow equitable
remedial rights in federal courts, the states may confer equitable sub-
stantive rights which will be administered in the federal courts.12  A
'Jurisdiction is not used in the strict sense of power to hear and determine
but rather in the sense of propriety or appropriateness according to established
principles of equity; see Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941) ;
Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935); Gordon v. Washington,
295 U. S. 30 (1935) ; Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 (1926) ;
Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923) ; In re Metropolitan
Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (1908). But see Atlas Ins. Co. v. Southern
Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893) ; In re
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1887).
'Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941) ; Pusey & Jones v.
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); accord, Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County,
281 U. S. 121 (1930) ; see See & Depew v. Fisheries Products Co., 9 F. 2d 235
(C. C. A. 2d 1925) (a case involving N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §55-147).
1 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1914) ; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S.
202 (1893); accord, David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489
(1911) (action at law); Mason v. U. S., 260 U. S. 545 (1922).
S ee Cowley v. Northern Pacific R. R., 159 U. S. 569 (1895); Gormley v.
Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (1890); Kohler v. McClellan, 156 F. 2d 908 (C. C. A. 5th
1946) ; Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F. 2d 938 (C. C. A. 3d 1942) ; Tower Hill-
Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F. 2d 817 (C. C. A. 4th 1933);
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Fiscal Fund, 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Dela.
1943). See also Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L. J.
401 (1946).
8304 U. S. 64 (1938).
p326 U. S. 99 (1945).
SHouseware Sales Corp. v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747, 750
(E. D. Wis. 1947) ; accord, Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 155 F. 2d 773 (C. C. A.
3d 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 621 (1947) ; Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F. 2d. 685
(C. C. A. 9th 1939). Contra: Pittsburgh Equitable Meter v. Loeber & Co., 160
F. 2d 721 CC. C. A. 7th 1947) (same circuit as instant case) ; see Kohler v.
McClelland, 156 F. 2d 908 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
" Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818) ; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet.
647, 658 (U. S. 1832) ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (U. S. 1868).
2 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932) ; Guardian Savings & Trust Co.
v. Road Improvement District, 267 U. S. 1 (1925); Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co:,
207 U. S. 1 (1907); Bardon v. Land & River Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (1895);
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nice distinction is required to determine when a state law merely confers
equitable remedial rights and when it confers equitable substantive rights.
From the deceptive and ambiguous meanings of the term, equitable
remedial rights, confusion has abounded. However, some idea of its
meaning is prerequisite to distinguishing equitable remedial rights from
equitable substantive rights. The term has not had the exclusive mean-
ing of referring to types of relief, e.g., specific performance, appoint-
ment of receiver, injunction. If that were its sole meaning, the distinc-
tion of equitable remedial rights from equitable substantive rights would
be relatively clear. Sometimes the term, equitable remedial rights, has
been used in the sense of the procedure in courts of chancery. 13 If that
were the extent of its meaning, the distinction would be the same as the
general distinction between "substance" and "procedure" which is nec-
essary in all civil actions of federal diversity jurisdiction.14  However,
in most cases the term, equitable remedial rights, denoted the elements
of a suit required to justify giving the desired equitable relief. For
example, in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen the statute, which was construed
as merely conferring an equitable remedial right, abolished the principle
of old English Chancery which made an execution returned unsatisfied
an element prerequisite to the appointment of a receiver. In this respect
."equitable remedial rights" has been used synonymously with "principles
of equity" or "rules of decision." Indeed some opinions have thus
phrased the doctrine of equitable remedial rights: "Remedies afforded
• . . in Federal [equity] courts are not determined by local laws or
rules of decisions, but by general principles, rules and usages of equity
having uniform operation in [Federal] courts wherever sitting."' 5
The purported distinction between equitable remedial rights in the
sense of principles of equity and equitable substantive rights has been
at best wholly unpredictable.' 0 However, where a state statute concerned
the title of real property, the Court has consistently construed such
Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (1890) (The Court said that in diversity of
citizenship cases' it would administer the equitable relief which state legislation
accords.) ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1883) (enlargements of rights will
be administered, "though in the form of remedial proceedings") ; Case of Brod-
erick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 194 (U. S.
1839).Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818).
14 Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence, 8 GEO. WAsH. L.
R-v. 1230 (1940); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REy. 271 (1939).
" Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 114 (1914); see also Livingston v. Story,
9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) ; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (U. S. 1832) ; United
States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 115 (U. S. 1819).
" For a suggested test, see Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 193, 195 (1923) "A statute
which allows a suit in equity to accomplish a result which could be attained by an
action at law gives a remedial right.. . .A statute which allows a suit in equity
to accomplish a result which, except for the statute, could not be attained either
at law or equity . . . gives an equitable substantive remedial right."
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statutes to create equitable substantive rights because reasons of policy
demanded uniformity within the statelT--a marked parallel to the ex-
ception to the Swift v. Tyson'8 rule.
The doctrine of equitable remedial rights emanated from a fear of
the hostile attitude of some states to courts of chancery and a desire for
national uniformity in equity'0 analogous to the Swift v. Tyson doctrine
at law. The doctrine served a valuable function when the federal equity
courts were in their infancy, but it belongs to the climate of juris-
prudential opinion of Swift v. Tyson.
Swift v. Tyson was overruled in 1938. The policy of Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins"0 was immediately extended to suits in equity.2 ' In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "To make an exception
to Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins on the equity side of a federal court is
to reject the considerations of policy which, after long travail, led to
that decision."1
22
Nevertheless, the decisions of the Supreme Court since 1938 do not
inevitably command agreement with Judge Duffy's conclusion in the
instant case that ihe doctrine of equitable remedial rights in the Pusey
case is no longer the law in diversity jurisdiction cases. 28 In Kelleam
v. Maryland Casualty Co.2 4 the Supreme Court squarely upheld the doc-
trine of equitable remedial rights in a diversity jurisdiction case. How-
ever, the force of this decision is weakened to some extent because:
(1) the Court did not mention Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, and (2) the
decision could have been made purely on a basis of affording comity to
the Oklahoma probate court.
25
7Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1 (1907) ; Bardon v. Land & River
Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (1895); Reynolds v. Crawfordville Bank, 112 U. S. 405
(1884); Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1883); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 194
(U. S. 1839) (federal courts will "give effect to state legislation and policy").
But cf. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891).
28 16 Pet. 1, 18 (U. S. 1842). Under the Swift v. Tyson rule, "when such rules
of property concerning real property have been declared by lines of decisions in
the state courts, then federal courts will consider themselves bound by these
decisions," DoBE oN FEDERAL PROCEDURE §143 (1928).
"- Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818); Guffey v. Smith, 237
U. S. 101 (1914); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202 (1893); Payne v.
Hook, 7 Wall, 425 (U. S. 1868) ; Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) ;
Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (U. S. 1832); United States v. Howland, 4
Wheat. 115 (U. S. 1819); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogony Ass'n, Inc., 129 F.
2d 227 (C. C. A. 3d 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 672 (1942). See von Mosch-
zisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 287 (1927).
20304 U. S. 64 (1938).
21 Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938).
22326 U. S. 99, 111 (1945).23E.g., Atlas Ins. Co. v. Southern Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939); Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (1939) (this was not a case of
federal diversity jurisdiction, but its dictum approving the doctrine of equitable
remedial rights has been transplanted by lower courts into cases of diversity juris-
diction) ; decisions in lower federal courts, collected in Comment, 55 YALE L. J.
401, n. 10 (1946).
2-312 U. S. 377 (1941); criticised, 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PaAcncE 114 (Supp.
1946).
^' Note, 50 YALE: L. J. 1094 (1941).
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The Supreme Court had an opportunity to abolish the doctrine of
equitable remedial rights in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 26 because the
court of appeals had expressly stated: "[Erie R. R. v. Tompkins] did
not in any way alter the wholly distinct doctrine, relating to equitable
'remedial rights.' ,27 However, the Supreme Court did two apparently
inconsistent things. First, it reversed the lower court's decision and laid
down the standard that state law will control in cases of federal diversity
jurisdiction whenever it significantly affects the outcome of the litigation.
Then, secondly, the Court proceeded to utter some dictum apparently
approving the doctrine of equitable remedial rights. The most note-
worthy and unfortunate dictum was: "State law cannot define the
remedies which a federal court must give simply because a federal court
in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the
State's courts.
'28
In the instant case, if these obiter remarks are ignored and if the
standard set forth in the Guaranty Trust case is applied, it is obvious
that the, outcome of the suit will be significantly affected by following
the Wisconsin statute, which makes an execution returned unsatisfied
unnecessary to the appointment of a receiver, instead of following the
contrary principle of old English Chancery.29
The reasoning in favor of following the Wisconsin statute would
be even stronger if a simple contract creditor had instituted his suit for
a receiver in a Wisconsin state court and a non-resident defendant had
removed the suit to a federal court. Under such circumstances, could
the over-all policy of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins condone the defendant's
invoking the doctrine of equitable remedial rights to nullify the plain-
tiff's right to a receiver under the Wisconsin statute ?3
After the instant case was decided, the Supreme Court in Angel v.
Bullington31 reached a result 32 whereby the federal court in a: diversity
jurisdiction case was bound by a North Carolina statute83 withdrawing
from the North Carolina courts jurisdiction to grant deficiency judg-
ments. Inter alia, the court said: "Cases like David Luptores Sons v.
26 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
" York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
"
8Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 106 (1945).29 In Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221 (U. S. 1872) Mr. Justice Swayne said:
"A party by going into a National Court does not lose any right or appropriate
remedy of which he might have availed himself in the State courts of the same
locality." In Puisey & Jones v. Hanssen the Court said the foregoing "oft-quoted
statement ...must be taken with the qualification [of the doctrine of equitable
remedial rights]." Today, is this qualification valid?
"' Cowley v. Northern Pacific R. R., 159 U. S. 569 (1895). Although this case
was decided long before the Erie case the court said: "It does not lie in his
[defendant's] mouth to claim such [federal] court has no jurisdiction."
= -- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 557 (1947).
32 See Farinholt, Angel v. Bullngton: Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction, 26
N. C. L. REv. 29 (1947) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 60 (1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36.
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Automobile Club 4 are obsolete. '85  The Lupton case had often been
cited for the proposition that state laws cannot enlarge or restrict fed-
eral jurisdiction. The Lupton case is distinguished from the instant
case because it was an action at law and also the statute in that case
attempted to restrict federal jurisdiction rather than to enlarge it.
The distinction between statutes which are construed to restrict fed-
eral equity jurisdiction and statutes which are urged to enlarge federal
equity jurisdiction may be decisive.3 6 The importance of the distinction
would be quite logical, if the Supreme Court should interpret federal
equity jurisdiction in the sense of power to hear and determine rather
than in the sense of propriety.37 Under such an interpretation, the
Court could consider it within its discretion to withhold a portion of its
federal equity pover in order to give effect to a state statute restricting
equity jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court could consider it beyond
its power to follow a state statute attempting to enlarge the reservoir
of federal equity jurisdiction which Congress has conferred.38
Consequently, whether the .language of the majority opinion in
Angel v. Bullington, "cases like the Lupton case are obsolete," was in-
tended to include suits of an equitable nature such as the instant case
where the state law attempts to enlarge equitable remedial rights is not
certain. The dissent seemed to think it did, because the dissent, citing
Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen and other cases espousing the doctrine of
equitable remedial rights, said: "The majority departs from controlling
precedents that state'enactments on jurisdiction, remedies and procedures
do not affect the jurisdiction, remedies and procedures of federal
courts." 39 It is hoped that the dissent's interpretation of the majority's
opinion is correct and that the obsolete doctrine of equitable remedial
rights has been abolished. However, it must be borne in mind that,
although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision in the
Guaranty Trust case, it has never specifically overruled the statement
34225 U. S. 489 (1911).
"Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 662, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 557 (1947).
'sThe history of the doctrine of equitable remedial rights shows that the
Supreme Court has been more favorably disposed to enforce statutory enlarge-
ments than statutory limitations because of a fear that the state might usurp fed-
eral equity, Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818); 1 POmER oY, EQuIr
JURISPRUDEN cE §292 (5th ed. Symons 1941). Today, "there is strong sentiment
in favor of entirely omitting cases based on diverse citizenship," MONTGOMERY'S
MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE §4" (4th ed. 1942). Federal
diversity jurisdiction may be judicially minimized by always affording the same
result in the federal court as would have been obtained in the state court by fol-
lowing the state law.
'7 See note 4 supra.
"1 STAT. 78 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1927). See Atlas Ins. Co. v South-
ern Inc.. 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939).
" 67- Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 557 (1947). But see Pittsburgh
Equitable Meter Co. v. Loeber & Co., 160 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A. 7th 1947) (decided
after the Bullington case and in the same circuit as the instant case).
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in the lower court's.opinion: "[Erie R. R. v: Tompkins] did not in any
way alter the wholly distinct doctrine relating to equitable remedial
rights.... There is no doubt that today, as before Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, a federal court sitting in a given state will, for instance,
refuse to appoint a receiver at the suit of an -unsecured creditor although
the statute of that state authorizes such an action." 40
In any event, even if the doctrine of equitable remedial rights has
been abolished, the litigant in a federal diversity jurisdiction case must
still resolve the general dilemma of "substance" and "procedure."
HENRY E. COLTON.
Habeas Corpus-A Method of Federal Review of State Decisions?
There has been an increasing number of applications for writs of
habeas corpus in the federal courts -to review the administration of
justice by the state courts. Such applications present a complex prob-
lem to the federal judge. He is torn between the traditional reluctance
of the federal courts to interfere with the states' administration of jus-
tice and the urgent desire to assure an accused of a fair trial.
In Stonebreaker v. Smyth,' recently decided by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals; the problem was aptly illustrated. The appellant,
Stonebreaker, was serving a sentence of fifty years in the Virginia
State Penitentiary, imposed by a Virginia court in 1931 upon pleas of
guilty to three indictments charging armed robbery. In 1943, Stone-
breaker had presented his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the trial
court, alleging that he had been denied due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in that, at
the time he was sentenced he was a minor twenty years of, age, ignorant
and uinformed as to his right to counsel, and incapable of representing
himself, and that he had pleaded guilty because of a confession that
had. been unfairly obtained from him. After full hearing on the merits,
the trial court discharged the writ and dismissed the petition; and a writ
of error was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Then, in 1944, an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.2
After more than two years, the petitioner filed his petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, relying on the identical grounds urged in the state
court in 1943. The district court, relying on White v. Ragen,3 dismissed
the petition without an examination into the substance of the allegations,
,York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
163 F. 2d 498 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
2 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 323 U. S. 754 (1944).
324 U. S. 760 (1944).
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on the ground that the matter had been fully heard in the state courts
on habeas corpus and that the Supreme Court of the United States had
denied certiorari.
On appeal, the circuit court, in a two to one decision, affirmed the
decision of the district court, also relying on White v. Ragen and upon
Ex parte Hawk.4
Before going into the actual decision of the district and circuit courts,
a review of some of the basic rules governing the issuance of writs of
habeas corpus by the federal courts may be of some value.
There is no doubt that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
a federal court to a prisoner held or imprisoned by state authority,
where he is in cust6dy in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States.5 But there are certain guiding. rules -which have been
set out to govern the. federal courts in passing upon such applications
for habeas corpus. Some of these rules follow:
1. Federal courts should be hesitant about any interference with the
administration of justice in the state courts, and, except in "rare" cases
of "peculiar urgency," should not entertain petitions for habeas corpus,
unless it clearly appears that the petitioner has exhausted his remedies
.in the courts of the state.6
Just what cases present circumstances of "peculiar urgency" so as
to justify a federal courts' intervention prior to an exhaustion of state
remedies obviously cannot be stated within any precise boundaries.
Whether or not the particular case presents such circumstances must,
of course, depend upon its own facts.7
' 321 U. S. 114 (1943).
'Rv. STAT. §§751 et seq. (1875), 28 U. S. C. §§451-455 (1940).
6 White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) ;
x parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943) ; Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943) ;
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179(1907) ; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1885).
"In Potter v. Dowd, 146 F. 2d 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1944), allegations that the
petitioner had been denied counsel in a trial for rape, was too poor to employ one,
was a man of little education and that a confession had been obtained by duress,
were held sufficient to warrant the intervention of a federal district court on
petition for habeas corpus, prior ta an exhaustion of state remedies.
In Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F. 2d 880 (C. C. A. 4th 1942), where the petitioner
was serving a sentence of 18 years imposed by a state court upon a conviction
of burglary, a hearing on habeas corpus in the district court had disclosed that the
accused was illiterate, had no funds to employ counsel and none was appointed for
him. The state criminal court judge had testified at the hearing that he had
thought during the trial that the accused was being represented by counsel of
his codefendants, and that he would not have sentenced the accused to more than
two years had jury trial been waived. It also appeared that jury trial could not
be waived, by state law, except where the defendant was represented by counsel.
The circuit court held that the petitioner was entitled to relief by habeas corpus
in the federal courts, but did not mention that it did not appear that the petitioner
had sought review of the state court's denial of relief by the Unied States Supreme
Court.
In Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (C. C. A. 6th 1938),
the petitioner had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death and had
[Vol. 26
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2. The usual remedies to be exhausted in the state courts are what-
ever review is provided by the states and any proceeding in the nature
of habeas corpus,0 including a writ of error coram nobis, if that is the
prescribed state remedy.10
3. On adverse decision of the highest state court on his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner, if dissatisfied, must have sought
to have that decision reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United
States by appeal or certiorari, else his state remedies are not so far.
exhausted as to permit the filing of a petition for habeas corpus in a
federal district court."1
4. After the petitioner has exhausted his- state remedies, including
application for review by appeal or certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, his petition for habeas corpus may then be entertained
by a federal district court. But at this point, the petitioner is con-
fronted with the rule relied upon in the principal case: "Where the
state courts have adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and this
[United States Supreme] Court has either reviewed or declined to
review the state court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-
examine upon habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated."'12
appealed and petitioned for new trial in the state courts. His petitions for habeas
corpus and writ of error coram nobis to the highest state court on grounds that
his counsel had not been granted adequate time to prepare his defense at trial
and that he had newly discovered evidence that he was convicted on perjured testi-
mony, had been denied on jurisdictional grounds. And, at the hearing on habeas
corpus, the Attorney General of Kentucky stated that he was "strongly inclined
to the view that Tom Jones was convicted on perjured testimony." These were
held sufficiently peculiarly urgent circumstances to warrant the interference by the
district court on habeas corpus, although no application had been made to the
United States Supreme Court for review of the state, court decisions.
In Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. 2d 586 (C. C. A. 5th 1931), a prisoner, who
was under sentence to be executed within two days and who could not make appli-
cation to the proper state court which would not hold regular term for some time,
was held entitled to habeas corpus by a federal court without exhaustion of his
state remedies.
In Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (1900), it was held that the detention
by state authority of a federal revenue officer whose presence at his post of duty
was important to the public welfare presented a case of such urgency as to war-
rant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the federal court, even before final
action by the state court.
8 Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943). But cf. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S.
471, 477 (1944), wherein it was said, in a case where denial of counsel was the
alleged violation of the Constitutional rights, that: "Heretofore we have not con-
sidered a failure to appeal an adequate defense to habeas corpus in this type of
case ...the failure to appeal only emphasizes the need of counsel." Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1940).
' Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).20 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943).
"See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764 (1944) ; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S.
114, 117 (1943) ; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 181, 182 (1906).
"See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764-765 (1944); House v. Mayo, 324
U. S. 42, 48 (1944); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1943); Salinger v.
Loisel, 265, U. S. 224. 230-232 (1923) ; United States ex rel. Parker v. Carey, 135
F. 2d 205 (C. C. A. 7th 1943).
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There are "exceptions" to the latter rule, in that, if the state affords
no remedy,'3 or if, in the particular case, the remedy is inadequate or
in practice unavailable, 14 a denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court does not preclude a re-examination by the federal dis-
trict court upon habeas corpus. 15 These are not actually exceptions to
the rule, for, if the state affords no remedy, or if in the particular case
the remedy is inadequate or in practice unavailable, the state courts
have not "adjudicated the merits of his contentions" within the meaning
of the rule. Obviously, if the state courts' denial of habeas corpus is
based on the ground that no such remedy is available under state law,
or that the contentions of the petitioner were not properly presented,
or upon some other adequate non-federal ground, the denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court of the United States is based merely on the
ground that it has no' jurisdiction to review, and can have no bearing
on the merits of the petitioner's contentions. 16
If the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court is
grounded upon want of jurisdiction, then the federal district court may
entertain the petition for habeas corpus. But even then, in the usual
case, there will remain some other state court remedy which has not
been exhausted; so that the district court might dismiss the petition on
that ground.
The net result of the above decisions appears to be that, when the
remedy of habeas corpus is readily available in the courts of the state,
as it is in Virginia,'7 a federal district court is not justified in inter-
fering with state custody by the issuance of habeas corpus, except in
those "rare cases" of "peculiar urgency," in which cases the interference
may be procured prior to an exhaustion of the state remedies. This for
the reason that, until the petitioner has first exhausted his remedies in
the state courts and has sought review in the United States Supreme
Court, a federal district court is not justified in issuing habeas corpus;
'
3 House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) where the Florida Supreme Court had
denied a writ of error from petitioner's conviction, an application for leave to
file a corarn nobis proceeding, and three petitions for habeas corpus, all without
a hearing and on the ground that the remedies sought were not appropriate to
the Florida state law. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 115 (1934).
" White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) where the Missouri Supreme Court
had dismissed the petitions for habeas corpus without requiring an answer and
without a hearing, and without an opinion, save an announcement that: "Any
petition which raises a question of fact only will not be considered." The United
States Supreme Court deemed this an announcement that no petition for habeas
corpus would be entertained by the Missouri Supreme Court unless, on its face, it
precluded any possibility of a trial of any issue of fact in that court.
" See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1943).10See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 765 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S.
42, 49 (1944) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 477 (1944) ; New York ex rel.
Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688, 690 (1942); Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1, 2
(1936).
17 VA. CODE (1942) §§5848-5861.
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and, after denial of habeas corpus by the state court and a refusal to
review by the United States Supreme Court, the weight of those deci-
sions, while not res judicata,i8 will effectively prevent a federal district
court from proceeding upon an independent inquiry into the very ques-
tions already adjudicated.' 0
In view of this apparent result, there may be a choice facing the
person who is imprisoned by state authority and who alleges a depriva-
tion of his constitutional Tights. If he has a case the facts of which
may possibly be interpreted as presenting circumstances .of "peculiar
urgency"20 and the state courts have "adjudicated the merits of his
contentions," its seems that he should directly petition the federal dis-
trict court for writ of habeas corpus. Then, if the district court should
dismiss the petition on the ground that no review had been sought in
the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner still has the chance
that the United States Supreme Court will grant relief on certiorari or
appeal. However, if he first seeks review by the United States Supreme
Court, and that review is denied, there seems little, if any, hope of his
getting a re-examination by the district court.
If this is the true picture to be gleaned from the stated rules, it
seems clear that, in the principal case, the district court and the majority
of the circuit court were correct in discharging the writ of habeas corpus.
But it is equally apparent that the crux of the question, as pointed out
by Judge Soper, is, what situations are sufficiently extraordinary or
unusual as to justify a re-examination by a federal district court on
habeas corpus of questions adjudicated on the merits by the state courts
and reviewed or declined by the United States Supreme Court? The
writer has been unable to find any cases in which the lower federal
courts have taken it upon themselves to re-examine on habeas corpus
upon such a state of the record. Perhaps the answer to the question
and the reason for the dearth of authority is, as already suggested, that
there are no such extraordinary or unusual situations. Certainly it
seems that, when a person convicted of crime in a state court has pressed
his contentions of a violation of his constitutional rights through the
state courts, has had a full hearing there, and has also sought review by
the United States Supreme Court, it is not too great an assumption
that there is no merit in his contentions. But if that is the anfswer,
IL Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U. .S. 219 (1943) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S.
101 (1942); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924).20 It should be noted that, while the United States Supreme Court may, by
REV. STAT. §716 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §377 and REv. STAT. §751 et seq. (1875), 28
U. S. C. §§451-455 issue original writs of habeas corpus, that Court will not
ordinarily do so, even after exhaustion of state remedies, before it has been sought
and denied in a district court or denied by a circuit or district court judge. See
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 117 (1943) ; E. parte Ab~rnathy, 320 U. S. 219(1943).
.1' See Note 7 supra.
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why did the United States Supreme Court say that a federal court
would not "ordinarily" re-examine such questions?
In the principal case, the contention of the petitioner was that his
was not an "ordinary" case, within the meaning of the rule because,
since his contentions were passed upon by the state court and since
certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, decisions
had been handed down by the United States Supreme Court that brought
about a "change or at least a clarification of the law with respect to
the necessity of counsel."2 1  And, he contended, in the light of these
decisions, he was entitled to a rehearing. To this contention the mnajor-
ity of the circuit court replied that the petitioner was probably correct,
but that, since the decisions mentioned could not have been before the
state court at the time his former petition for habeas corpus was pre-
sented, he had not exhausted his state remedies, and should file another
petition in the state court.
Obviously, in this reply of the majority there is a clear recognition
of at least prima facie merit to the petitioner's contentions that he has
been deprived of his constitutional rights. Thus, support is lent to the
conclusion that there are no cases so extraordinary or unusual as to
justify the issuance of habeas corpus by a federal district court after
a full hearing by the state court and a denial of or review by certiorari
or appeal by the United States Supreme Court.
Also, by way of lending support to their decision, the majority of
the circuit court argue that the state courts can give the petitioner relief
more expeditiously than would a reversal of the decision of the district
court, since an application for certiorari "would almost certainly be
made if we were to take the habeas corpus matter out of the hands
of the state courts." 22  Judge Soper, in his dissent, contends that the
circuit court should act immediately, since there is no assurance that
the state court will change its mind. Of course, whether a further
petition to the Virginia courts will result in more immediate relief to
the petitioner depends entirely upon the action of that court.
JOE H. BARRINGTON, JR.
21 De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1946); Canzio v. New York, 327
U. S.,82 (1945), rehearing denied, 327 U. S. 816 (1945) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S.
786 (1944)-in all of which cases it was held that a plea of guilty did not neces-
sarily involve an "intelligent waiver" of right to counsel. Tompkins v. Missouri,
323 U. S. 485 (1944) in which it was held that a request for counsel was not
necessary to preserve the right.
2_ Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. 2d 498, 502 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
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Pleading and Parties-Class Actions in North Carolina
A recent Virginia decision held that certain operative facts must
exist before the class action rule may be invoked.' Furthermore if
such a suit is allowed there is a proper procedure for conducting it to
which it must conform. The summary method in which the court dis-
posed of the subject affords little as a guide to future cases. The North
Carolina decisions have shown the same tendency with the result that
the status of the law is at most problematical. This situation has arisen
largely 'due to the inadequacy of the statute which permits such actions.
The North Carolina Code requires all parties to an -action to actually
join. There is an exception to this rule:
"When the question is one of common or general interest -of
many persons or where the parties are so numerous that it is
impractical to bring them all before the court one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all."12
Thisprovision was originally put in the Code to enact a rule of
equity pleadings that where the parties to an action were very numerous
or it was impractical to bring them all before the court, one or more
could sue or defend for the benefit of those who did not actually join.
The -statute is so worded, however, that the North Carolina court has
construed it to not only enact the equity rule ("parties are so numer-
ous") but to enlarge its scope so as to permit a class action where "the
question is one of common or general interest."3  The problem is in
determining what factors constitute each of these permissive clauses.
Courts of other states cannot agree on these factors and the result has
been a myriad of rules honored only in their breach. 4 The North Caro-
lina decisions are so few that the status of the law in this state is inde-
terminate. The following construction which has been given the statute
seems to at least be consistent with the North Carolina cases.
(1) Where the question is one of a common or general interest of
many persons one or more may sue or defend for the rest. "Many"
merely means more than one person since the emphasis of the clause is
on "interest" and not on the impracticability of joinder.5 Thus if two
'O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 42 S. E. 2d 269, 279 (Va. 1947).
2N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-70.
a Foster v. Hackett, 112 N. C. 546, 554, 17 S. E. 426, 427 (1893) ("Section
185 of the Code reaffirms this principle, and enlarges its operation, by allowing
one to sue for all others, both where the parties are very numerous, and where
they have common interests, in all actions, without regard to their nature.");
Bronson v. Wilmington, North Carolina Life Insurance Co., 85 N. C. 411, 414
(1881).
'See Blume, The "Comnon Questions" Principle in the Code Provisions for
Representative Suits, 30 MIicH. L. REv. 878 (1932).
Hilton Bridge Construction Co. v. Foster, 26 Misc. 338, 57 N. Y. Supp. 140(1899) (The court decided that three persons were not so numerous as to makejoinder impracticable but went on to observe that three did have a common interest
in-the suit and that such number was sufficient to constitute "many.") ; McKenzie
v. L'Armoureux, 11 Barb. 516 (N. Y. 1851).
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or more persons have causes of action so closely related that the joinder
sections of the Code would permit, but not require, these persons to
join in one action a class suit may be proper though, of course, it is not
mandatory.
A case to which this clause is applicable arises when a tenant in
common sues for possession of land in his behalf and in behalf of hiq
co-tenants. The co-tenants do not have to join because the right to
possession is deemed of common or general interest to them all.6 The
suit would seem proper under this clause if there was ,only one other
tenant in common.
Of similar effect are the cases where representation of remaindermen
is involved. The North Carolina court, contrary to the overwhelming
weight of authority,7 has held that a life tenant does not have a sufficient
common interest with a vested remainderman to represent him.8 On
the other hand a remainderman in esse has sufficient common interest
with a remainderman of the same class in posse to represent him.0
Other situations have arisen in this state where the statute has been
invoked on a "common interest" basis rather than on the impracticability
of joining all parties.' 0 In most of these cases joinder of all parties.
would have been impractical but nonetheless it was not the test used in
determining if the class suit was proper.
(2) Where the parties are so numerous as to make it impractical
for all to join one may sue or defend for the benefit of the others. This
provision is the true equity rule poorly stated. It seems to allow the
class suit only in situations where impracticability of joinder exists
because the parties are numerous. This was not the equity rule nor
is it the North Carolina rule."1 Where it is impracticable to join parties
because they are out of the jurisdiction, are unknown, cannot be located,
are not in esse, or for other reasons making it inconvenient or impos-
sible to join them the class suit has been allowed. 12 Whether a number
is so large that it would be impracticable to join all the parties is de-
pendent, not upon any arbitrary limit, but rather upon the circumstances
of each particular case.13 The common interest which constitutes a
'Allred v. Smith, 135 N. C. 443, 47 S. E. 597 (1904) ; Foster v. Hackett, 112
N. C. 546, 554, 17 S. E. 426, 427 (1895).
Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S. W. 423 (1922).
8 Springs v. Scott, 132 N. C. 548, 44 S. E. 116 (1903); Williams v. Hassell,
74 N. C. 434 (1876) ; Watson v. Watson, 56 N. C. 400 (1857).
'Beam v. Gilkey, 225 N. C. 520. 35 S. E. 2d 641; Yancey's Case, 124 N. C.
151, 32 S. E. 491 (1899).
10 Jones v. Commissioners,, 143 N. C. 59, 55 S. E. 427 (1906) (taxpayers);
Nash v. Sutton, 109 N. C. 550, 14 S. E. 77 (1891) (church members).
"XFoster v. Hackett, 112 N. C. 546, 554, 17 S. E. 426, 427 (1893); STORY,
CommENTARmS ON EQurrY PLEADINGS §§80-104 (2d ed. 1840).11 Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U. S. 288 (1853) ; Etheridge v. Vernoy, 71 N. C.
184 (1874) - Vann v. Hargett, 22 N. C. 31 (1838).
" In re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 646 (1914).
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class under this clause is one in which joinder of all the parties would
be required if it were not for the class actiqn statute.
Many of the problems arising under the statute have been due, not
to the ambiguity of the statute, but to its failure to cover verbally the
particular situation.
Although the statute applies to actions at law and in equity it is
silent as to the proper procedure for conducting such a suit. The courts
have held that the action must be begun as a class action' 4 and sufficient
facts alleged to show the necessity of such a suit.15 A court order is
probably necessary permitting the class action and it is generally con-
ceded to be discretionary with the trial court as to whether the require-
ments of a class suit have been met.' 6 The represented parties should
be allowed to actually join in the suit on request.' 7  Those of the class
who are effected by the judgment must contribute .their ratable share
to the expense of the suit.'8 The suit probably could not be discharged
by the actual parties without the consent of those represented if it
would in any manner prejudice the rights of the latter.'0 The suit has
been held applicable to cases before administrative tribunals.20
All courts require those of the class who represent the others to
meet certain requirements and yet the statute does not cover this point.
Either plaintiffs or defendants may be represented 2' but one permitted
to sue for another's benefit must show a personal interest in the action.22
Those named as representatives must have an interest which is co-
extensive and wholly compatible, mutual and not conflicting, with the
interests of those whom they would represent.23  Facts must be alleged
to satisfy the court of the sincerity of the representation. Unless these
requirements of adequate representation are met due process of law has
not been afforded the absent parties 2 4
The statute says nothing as to the effect a judgment will have on the
" O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 42 S. E. 2d 269, 279 (Va. 1947).
" Foster v. Hackett, 112 N. C. 546, 554, 17 S. E. 426, 427 (1893) ; Vann v.
Hargett, 22 N. C. 31, 36 (1838) ("When a sufficient reason to excuse the defect
of parties is suggested by the bill.").1 In re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 646 (1914).
' Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1 (1876) ("We think the amendment made
by the Judge, by permitting other taxpayers to be joined as plaintiffs, was.within
his power and was proper.").
" Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 183 N.. C. 546, 112
S. E. 252 (1922).
-" Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (C. C. W. D.
Pa. 1891).
"
0 Note, 25 MicH. L. REv. 184-5 (1926).
"
1 Thames v. Jones, 97 N, C. 121 (1887).2 Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 288, 145
S. E. 563, 567 (1928).
"Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 161, 56 S. E. 691, 693 (1907) ; see however,
Perry v. Whitaker, 71 N. C. 477 (1874) (fact that the class had divergent views
as to their rights did not make the class suit improper).
" Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940).
1948]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
absent parties and the cases have shown a reluctance to discuss the
question.25 The authorities are in dispute as to the considerations which
determine the effect of the judgment.28 The federal statute proceeds
on the theory that the jural relations which constitute the class are the
determining factor 2 7 Others contend it hinges on whether joinder in
the action would have been compulsory or permissive. The two views
are not necessarily inconsistent and in effect they say that where the
interests of the class are joint, common, or secondary so that the class
would ordinarily be required to join then the judgment will be con-
clusive to all parties just as if they were before the court.2 8 If the
interests of the class are several so that the parties would be permitted
but not required to join then they are accordingly permitted the effects
of the judgment but not required to take them. The absent parties
indicate their choice by actually joining in the action at some stage.20
Notice of the action to the absent parties is probably not essential for
the judgment to be binding"° nor does the fact that the absent parties
are under a disability change the result.31
This summation of the law is largely taken from court dicta and
inferences drawn from the cases in which the problem has arisen. The
statute affords little aid and the cases of other states construing similar
statutes are in hopeless conflict.3 2 The corresponding federal statute
was recognized to be inadequate and was accordingly revised. It would
seem that any clarification of the statute, which involves a field of law
"receiving new recognition because of the growing number of instances
where parties to litigation are multitudinous," would indeed be helpful.
HOYT PATRIcK TAYLOR, JR.
2" Foster v. Hackett, 112 N. C. 546, 554, 17 S. E. 426, 427 (1893); Bronson
v. Insurance Co., 85 N. C. 411, 415 (1881).28 See Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 CORN¢.
L. Q. 399, 427 (1933)..2 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE §23.04 (1938).
" Taylor v. Insurance Co., 214 N. C. 770, 200 S. E. 882 (1938).
" Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 183 N. C. 546; 112
S. E. 252 (1922) ; First National Bank of Florence v. Edwards, 134 S. C. 348,
132 S. E. 824 (1926); Honesdale Co. v. Montgomery, 56 W. Va. 397, 49 S. E.
433 (1904).
0
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §86 comment h (1942) ("If they (the absent
parties] were adequately represented, however, it is immaterial that they were not
given notice or did not know of the existence of the action.") ; Contra: Towle v.
Donnell, 49 F. 2d 49 (C. C. A. 6th 1931).
" CarsWell v. Creswell, 217 N. C. 40, 7 S. E. 2d 58 (1939).
2An illustration of the confusion which exists is in the indecision as to
whether the statute is applicable to suits against unincorporated associations. See




Torts-Injury to Trespassing Child-Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine
Plaintiff, a six-year-old boy, while playing on a pile of timberp
placed on defendant's railroad platform was injured when one of the
timbers fell. Defendant had knowledge of the fact that children resorted
to the platform and pile to play. Held: nonsuit affirmed. The evidence
does not disclose that the pile of timbers was inherently dangerous, or
so attractive or alluring as to impose upon the defendant the duty to
anticipate and guard against the efforts of children to play there.1
Until a comparatively recent date,2 the common law refused to rec-
ognize liability of a landowner to trespassers injured by dangerous con-
ditions on the land. But it is now established in many states that a
trespassing child of tender years may recover for injuries sustained as
a result of dangerous conditions of the land.3
Some courts have based this newly recognized duty to keep one's
premises safe for anticipated child-trespassers on the fiction that a
child is attracted or allured by the dangerous object or condition and
thereby enters by implied invitation as an invitee, to whom the land-
owner owes a duty of ordinary care.4 Others have sustained the doc-
trine on the maxim that one must so use his property as not to harm
others ;5 others, that a child of tender years is not a trespdsser, or at
best, only a technical trespasser;6 still others, that an attraction of
1 Boyette v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 227 N. C. 406 42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947).
- Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Reprint 1041 (1841), is advanced as
original authority for the attractive nuisance doctrine. There a child was injured
when he climbed upon defendant's horse cart left standing untied in the highway.
Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1874) is the leading
"turntable" case. See 38 Am. JuR., NEGLIGExCE §143.
'For a list of states see: Note, 36 A. L. R. 34 (1925) ; Hudson, The Turntable
Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARv L. Rxv. 826, 854, n. 103 (1922-1923) ; 22
WASH. U. L. Q. 141, n. 2 (1936) ; 45 C. J. 785, n. 9.
For coverage of the general doctrine see: Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Land-
owters to Children Entering Without Permission, 11 HARv. L. Rxv. 349, 434
(1897-98); Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L. REv.
826 (1922-23) ; Green, Landozwr v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of
Responsibility in Tort, 21 MicH. L. Rav. 495 (1922-23). Townes, Is a Restate-
mentof the Law as to the Liability Arising from Dangerous Premises Desirable
and Practical, 1 TEx. L. REv. 1, 388 (1922-23). For emphasis on the North
Carolina situation see: Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine,
1 N. C. L. Rav. 162 (1922); Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934).
' Wilmes v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 175 Iowa 101, 116, 156 N. W. 877, 883
(1916) ("He [defendant] is charged with liability because of the imputed knowl-
edge of the habits of children to use a thing so temptingly presented as a play-
thing, and he is liable because he has invited the child. ."), Keffe v. Milwaukee
and S. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1875); United Zinc & Chemical
Co. v. Van Britt. 258 U. S. 268 (1922).
'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas "teaches nothing but a benevolent yearn-
ing." Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rrv. 1, 3 (1894-95). See
Chesko v. Delaware & H. Co., 218 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 3rd 1914) ; Alabama G. S. R.
Co. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561 (1901).
' Hardy v. Missouri P. R. Co., 266 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 8th 1920).
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children by a dangerous instrumentality amounts to an intention to
injure, 7 or a reckless disregard of safety," or a trap.0
Cases emphasizing-attraction and allurement, as opposed to danger
.and foreseeability, especially in those jurisdictions that adopt the fiction
of implied invitation, have tended to limit the principle of recovery
"to the point of absurdity." 10 Not infrequently recovery has been lim-
ited to the case "where the child was shown to have trespassed only
because of the attraction." The result has been doctrinaire rules of
liability, undesirable and unwieldly in the field of negligence.' 2
The most satisfactory theory adopted seems to be that the land-
owner's liability rests upon "the general legal standard of social con-
duct," i.e., due care under the circumstances."3 As so recognized the
rule reads as follows: "An owner or occupier of land must use such
care as a man of ordinary prudence would use under the circumstances
to prevent serious hurt to others because of the dangerous condition of
his premises when such condition is known, or should have been known,
to him and may be remedied or guarded against readily with reasonable
cost, when the presence of other persons and their exposure to such
hurt may reasonably be anticipated." 1
4
Some twenty-seven cases involving the "attractive nuisance" doc-
trine have arisen in North Carolina.' 5 The general attitude of the court
'Jeremiah Smith, supra note 3 at 355, criticizes as grossly erroneous the find-
ing of an intent to injure.
.Altus v. Millikin, 98 Okla. 1, 223 Pac. 851 (1924); Shawnee v. Cheek, 41
Okla. 227, 137 Pac. 724 (1913).9 Keffe v. Milwaukee and S. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1875).
1 "Wilson, supra note 3 at 166. One need only refer to the annotation in 36
A. L. R. 34 (1925) to verify this conclusion.
"United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van -Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922) is the lead-
ing case.
12 , . . it is not fashionable to speak of the landowner's duty to use care in
maintaining his land, and many courts have attempted instead to make a set of
fixed rules built on categories to do the work of a standard.... The result is
that inclusions in the categories are varied to suit the cases. .. H" udson, supra
note 3 at 847.
" Hudson, supra note 3 at 840-845, argues for the theory in this vein: The
social interest in the general security and the social interest in the development of
land and freedom of enterprise are to be balanced. These competing forces are
best reconciled by a standard of judgment, its application dependent upon the
variables of each case, ie.,.the general legal standard of social conduct-that one
act with due care. under the circumstances to avoid injury to others. See Gim-
mestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 534, 261 N. W. 194, 195 (1935) where
it is said: "Here the duty of defendants must necessarily !find its source in special
circumstances in which, by reason of the inducement and of the fact that visits
of children to the place would naturally be anticipated, and because of the char-
acter of the danger to which they would unwittingly be exposed, reasonable pru-
dence would require that precautions be taken for their protection.' Best Adm'r
v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 419 (1933)."
"'See Townes, supra note 3. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, §339 (1934).
'I Nichols v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 228 N. C. 222, 44 S. E. 2d 879, 1947;
Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406, 42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947) ; Barlowe
v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223
N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503 (1943) ; Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C.
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may be said to favor a guarded application of the doctrine.16 Recovery
has been allowed the trespassing child in but three situations: where
the instrumentality was (a) a charged electric wirelT or (b) dynamite
caps,18 or (c) an artificial pool of water.'0 The following observations
can be made: (1) Conditions where recovery was allowed have all been
artificial and obviously of extreme danger.20 (2) Plaintiff must gen-
782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941); Harris v. Winston-Salem Ry., 220 N. C. 689, 18
S. E. 2d 204 (1941) ; Prather'v. Bank, 211 N. C. 98, 189 S. E. 182 (1936) ; Cum-
mings v. Dunning, 210 N. C. 156, 185 S. E. 653 (1936) ; Jackson v. Standard Oil
Co., 208 N. C. 766, 182 S. E. 490 (1935); Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398,
177 S. E. 114 (1934); Boyd v. Atlanta & C. R. R., 207 N. C. 390, 177 S. E. 1
(1934) ; Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925) ;
Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925) ; Richardson
v. Libes, 188 N. C. 112, 123 S. E. 306 (1924) ; Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry.,
187 N. C. 786, 123 S. E. 1 (1924) ; Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100
S. E. 619 (1919) ; Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851
(1918) ; Gurley v. Power Co.,- 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) ; Ragan v.
Traction Co., 170 N. C. 92, 86 S. E. 1001 (1915) ; Parker v. Charlotte Electric
Ry., 169 N. C. 68, 85 S. E. 33 (1915) ; Starling v. Selma Cotton Mills, 168 N. C.
229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915) ; Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826
(1914) ; Benton v. Public Service Co., 165 N. C. 354, 81 S. E. 448 (1914) ; Greer
v. Damascus Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 116, 76 S. E. 731 (1912) ; Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) ; Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting
and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908); Kramer v. Southern Ry.,
127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900).
Ten of these cases are not strictly under the attractive nuisance doctrine either
because the child was on public property, or the ownership of the property was
in a third party or not shown on the record, or the child was an invitee or licensee.
But the cases are pertinent and important for their discussions and references to the
doctrine. See supra this note: the Cummings case, the Campbell case, the Graham
case, the Corner case, the Gurley case, the Ragan case, the Parker case, the Benton
case, the Greer case, and the Kramer case.
"e Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925),
"We are not disposed to extend the so-called attractive nuisance doctrine."
'Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925)
(whether defendant owned the land not on the record) ; Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton
Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) (plaintiff's intestate trespassed and
swung on charged wire).8 Richardson v. Libes, 188 N. C. 112, 123 S. E. 306 (1924) ; Krachanake v.
Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851 (1918) (Brown, J., dissented saying
that there was no evidence that plaintiff knew caps were on the premises) ; Barnett
v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826 (1914). Bu cf. Luttrell v. Caro-
lina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941) (held, as matter of law,
evidence insufficient to charge defendant with knowledge that children played on
the premises).
" Barlowe v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944); Brannon v.
Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934); Starling v. Selma Cotton Mills,
168 N. C. 229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915). Recovery denied in these cases: Hedgepath
v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d. 503 (1943) (defendant had no notice
children swam in pool, nor was pool so attractive as to charge him with notice.) ;
Gurley v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) (defendant company
had no notice that its servant was allowing children to swim in its tank; servant
bey6nd scope of his employment).
In Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925),
recovery was allowed where four-year-old started and fell from negligently parked
electric truck, but the court emphasized the fact that the truck was parked on a
public street and that the intestate child was a member of the public.0 Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406, 408, 42 S. E. 2d 462, 463
(1947) (". . . doctrine of the turntable cases should be applied to all things that
are uncommon and are artificially produced . . . and are attractive and are in-
herently dangerous.... Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222."). Cf. Hudson,
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erally be not over twelve years of age to escape the defense of con-
tributory negligence.2 1 This is a jury question.22 (3) Failure of the
parents to prevent the injury is generally not a bar to recovery.2
(4) Whether defendant owes a duty to plaintiff depends on (a) main-
tenance of an "attractive nuisance" or dangerous instrumentality or
condition, 24 and (b) reasonable foreseeability that children are likely to
come upon the land and be hurt by contact with the object.25 The court
would seem to say that both "a" and "b" are questions of law.20 It is
intimated that extreme attractiveness alone will charge defendant with
notice.27 (5) Even if "a" and "b" of "4," supra, are established, it
supra note 3 at 852, where it is said: "It seems quite impossible to draw a satis-
factory line between 'artificial and natural' uses, or normal and abnormal." No
North Carolina cases on the natural condition of land seem to have arisen. Query:
Would the court deny recovery where a small, useless quicksand bog, natural but
easily protected was frequented by children to the knowledge of the defendant?21 Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925) (a boy
of fourteen is presumed to be able to sense and avoid danger, but proof of lack
of intelligence is admissible; attention commensurate with child's mental age is
required); Briscoe v. Henderson Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908)(court could find no cases where boy of thirteen could rely on "attractive allure-
ments of machinery"); Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 826
(1914) (recovery allowed where trespassing child of eleven exploded dynamite
caps).
"
2Graham v. Sandhill Power Co., 189 N. C. 381, 127 S. E. 429 (1925).2
"Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911); Comer
v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919).
"
2 Sce note 20 supra.
2' Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600
(1908) is the leading North Carolina case on this point. At page 411 it is said:
"... liability for injuries to children sustained by dangerous conditions on one's
premises is recognized . . . provided the facts are such as to impose the duty of
anticipation or prevision; that is, whether under all the circumstances he should
have anticipated that children would be attracted or allured to go upon his prem-
ises and sustain injury." A dictum to the effect that the owner may be charged
with notice by the very nature of the object is found in Barlowe v. Gurney, 224
N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339 comment a;
38 Am. Jim.. NEGLIGENCE §145.
Reasonable foreseeability that children may enter and be injured is established
only by showing that children often played on the premises and that defendant
knew or could reasonably have known of their habit to play on or near the
instrumentality. Barlowe v. Gurney, 224 N. C. 223, 29 S. E. 2d 681 (1944) (re-
covery allowed where children commonly played around and in pool, as defendant
knew); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503 (1943) (nonsuit
aff'd, no evidence that children ever swam in the pool); Luttrell v. Carolina
Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941) (evidence must show that
children habitually played on the premises and that defendant knew this or should
have known it).
"
6 Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 789, 18 S. E. 2d 412, 416
(1941) (". . . what is negligence is a question of law [in North Carolina] and
when the facts are admitted or established the court must say whether it does or
does not exist. 'This rule extends to the question of negligent breach of duty
and also to the feature of proximate cause.' Hoke, J., in Hicks v. Mfg. Co., 138
N. C. 319, 50 S. E. 703 [1905]."). It is clear that most North Carolina cases
on the trespassing child situation are dismissed because the court finds no duty
owed under the circumstances. Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 406,
42 S. E. 2d 462 (1947); Hedgepath v. Durham, 223 N. C. 822, 28 S. E. 2d 503
(1943).
'See note 25 supra.
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would appear that the court must find that the utility of maintaining
the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein.28  (6) Defendant's breach of duty by failure to exercise the
care reasonably demanded under the circumstances must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.29 This, too, is a question of law if only one
inference can be drawn from the facts.3 0 (7) The duty to the plaintiff
established, failure of the defendant to exercise due care under the cir-
cumstances is a question of fact for the jury.3 1
North Carolina, though apparently adopting the general negligence
rule,32 frequently complicates the theory upon which recovery is based
by (a) citation of-cases from jurisdictions using the theory of allure-
ment as invitation,3 3 (b) by distinguishing cases which are brought
before it "bottomed" on negligence from those "bottomed" on the
principle of "attractive nuisance as elucidated in Sioux City S. P. R. R.
v. Stout," and apparently applying different rules of recovery,34 and
(c) by categorizing certain objects as attractive nuisances as opposed
to those which are not.35 The court often speaks of attraction and
allurement as if they were a sine qua non of liability.36 It is submitted
"Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934). REsTATEMENT, ToRTs §339(d) (1934).
29 Prather v. Bank, 211 N. C. 98, 189 S. E. 182 (1936).
'
0 Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N. C. 782, 18 S. E. 2d 412 (1941).2 1Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., supra note 30. Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207
N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934).
"2 Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 340 (1934).
"Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934) ; Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911).
-, Boyette v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N: C. 406, 407, 42 S. E. 2d 462, 463
(1947) ("Plaintiff's action is not bottomed on the principle of attractive nuisance
. .. but on negligence... !" The court then points out that the plaintiff cannot
recover on negligence, nor can he recover on the attractive nuisance doctrine). In
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925), the
court evidently could not find that an electric truck was an "attractive nuisance'
but managed to grant recovery without trouble since plaintiff's complaint was
based on negligence. See note 16 supra.
" Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934) (Connor, J.,
dissenting on grounds evidence does not show that well was an attractive nuisance) ;
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925) (electric
truck is not an attractive nuisance, but recovery allowed on negligence prin-
ciples) ; Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178 N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919) (bridge
not an attractive nuisance but recovery allowed on negligence principles) ; Gurley
v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916) (dictum that attractive nuisance
doctrine not applicable to pools or reservoirs).
"Thus in Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting and Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62
S. E. 600 (1908) the court sustained a demurrer to the complaint saying that
plaintiff failed to allege that children had been allured or attracted to the premises,
or that plaintiff had in fact been attracted thereon. Again in Ferrell v. Dixie
Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911) the court cites with equal
facility and approval cases which follow the implied invitation doctrine (often
requiring that the plaintiff be lured) and cases -which require due care under
the circumstances. The dissent in Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435,
95 S. E. 851 (1918) would deny recovery on the basis that children were not
attracted by the instrumentality.
The tendency of the court to circumscribe the principle of recovery with legal
definitions of what is or is not an attractive nuisance may possibly be attributed
to a desire to keep the issue out of jury hands.
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that the attractiveness of the object is an element only to the extent that
it helps answer this question: "Did the landowner know or by reason-
able care could he have known that children were likely to trespass on
a part of the land upon which he maintained a condition likely to be
dangerous to them because of their childish propensities to intermeddle
or otherwise ?,,37
The principal case, while in harmony with the reasoning of past
decisions and while the result seems equitable, continues what is sub-
mitted as an undesirable precedent by classifying certain instrumental-
ities as attractive or dangerous instead of clearly recognizing that
liability should rest primarily upon foreseeability of injury to a child
whose presence should have been anticipated. "The greater the hazard,
the greater the care required."88 The court should repudiate all ref-
erence to the fiction of implied invitation and "attractive nuisance" and
affirm the principle that recovery be based entirely on general principles
of negligence.
LENNOX P. MCLENDON, JR.
Trusts-Inheritance by Murderer-The Constructive Trust
and a Statutory Solution*
In a recent case,1 the Georgia Supreme Court decided that a hus-
band inherited his wife's estate under the statute of descent and dis-
tribution in spite of the fact that he had murdered her, holding that
it was not justified in reading into a clear and unconditional statute an
exception denying the right of a murderer to inherit from his victim.
Statutes of descent and distribution and the Statute of Wills gen-
erally contain no such exception, and in the absence of other specific
"
7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339, comment a (1934). Gimmestad v. Rose Bros.
Co., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194 (1935).
' Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 194 Minn. 531, 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196
(1935). At page 536, 261 N. W. 194, 196, the court continues: "Nothing more
is needed to support the proposition that one who maintains on his premises an
artificial condition is liable for resulting injury to young children trespassing
thereon if:
'(a) The place where the condition is maintained is one upon -which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
'(b) The condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily injury to such children, and
'(c) The children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
'(d) The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein.' RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(Tentative Draft No. 4) §209 [RESTATEMENT, TORTS §339 (1934)]."
* The closely related problems arising in the fields of insurance, bank deposits,
and other property relationships are outside the scope of this note.
1 Crumley v. Hall, 43 S. E. 2d 646 (Ga. 1947).
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legislative declaration on the matter, a number of cases 2 have reached
the same result as the Georgia decision on the grounds that the devolu-
tion of property is completely controlled by statute and to make an
exception thereto would be judicial legislation. Some courts3 have also
felt that a denial of the right to inherit would constitute a forfeiture of
estate for conviction of crime in violation of statutory or constitutional
provisions. On the other hand, several cases 4 have denied the right
of a murderer to take from his victim by descent or devise, reasoning
that the legislature could not have intended to let a murderer so acquire
property when it enacted the statute and that the statute must be con-
strued with reference to the common law principle that no man may
profit from his own wrong. Neither view is satisfactory; the first
allows the murderer to acquire property by his crime, while the second
involves the reading of implied exceptions into an unambiguous and
peremptory statute.
Conceding that under the law a murderer may acquire property by
his crime, and this appears to be the sounder of the two views men-
tioned,5 was the court in the instant case bound to let him retain it?
Several writers6 have suggested the use of a constructive trust to resolve
this problem. This device has been employed by a few courts7 and
incorporated into the RESTATEmENT OF R-STITUTION. 8 The North Car-
' E.g., Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 784 (1894); McAllister v.
Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 993, 185
S. W. 487 (1916) ; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894),
reversing 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700; Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794
(1888) (dower) ; In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895) ; Hill
v. Noland, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 149 S. W. 288 (1912). Note that all the
above cases involve intestacy. See cases collected in 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §478, n. 27 (1946).
'E.g., Wilson v. Randolph, 50 Nev. 371, 261 Pac. 654 (1927); Owens v.
Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888) (dower); In re Carpenter's Estate,
170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895).
'E.g., Weaver v. Hollis, - Ala. - , 22 So. 2d 525 (1945) (intestacy);
Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470 (1935) (intestacy); Perry v. Straw-
bridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) (intestacy, followed in Eisenhardt v.
Siegel, 342 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. 2d 810 [1938]) ; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506,
22 N. E. 188 (1889) (will); Re Estate of Edith Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, 211
N. W. 652 (1927) (will); in the Estate of Hall (1914) Probate 1 (C. A.)
(England). And see cases collected in 3 BoGr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTES §478,
n. 30 (1946).
AMES, LECTUREs ON LEGAL HisToRY 310-12 (1913); Note, 8 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rav. 492 (1931).
' Ames, op. cit. supra note 5 at 310 (1913) ; Notes, 9 Iu.. L. REv. 505 (1915);
4 HARV. L. REv. 394 (1891); 8 HARv. L. REV. 170 (1896); 29 MIcHi. L. REv. 745
(1931); 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 100 (1931).
'E.g., Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 596, 36 A. 2d 888 (Ct. of Ch. 1944)
(will) ; Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 45, 167 At1. 517 (Ct. of Ch. 1933)(tenancy by the entirety); Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540
(1896) (in effect overruling Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188
[1889]); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918)
(tenancy by the entirety) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927)
(tenancy by the entirety).
'§187: (1) Where a devisee or legatee murders the testator; he holds the
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olina Supreme Court in Bryant v. Bryant imposed a constructive trust
on property in the hands of a tenant by the entirety who had murdered
his spouse, but has not yet had occasibn to employ it in a case involving
a will or intestacy.
Equity, in preventing unjust enrichment, has long used the con-
structive trust to deprive one of property wrongfully acquired, and it
has been pointed out that acquisition of property by murder presents
an apt case for the application of this remedy."" By its use the ob-
jections to reading implied exceptions into a statute are avoided, for
the trust is imposed on the property after it reaches the hands of the
murderer. The argument that a denial of the right to inherit consti-
tutes a forfeiture of estate is inappropriate here because there is no
such denial, the statute being allowed to operate in the normal manner.
And it would appear that the contention in an Illinois case" that the
imposition of a constructive trust constitutes such a forfeiture is un-
tenable because this is a civil action, not criminal, and the trust is
imposed not as a punishment for his crime as such, but because the
murderer has been unjustly enriched.12  If the means by which prop-
erty is acquired are such as to shock the conscience of equity, it would
appear irrelevant that they also constitute an offense punishable in a
criminal action. At any rate, those courts employing the constructive
trust have not been concerned with any violation of constitutional pro-
hibitions. This remedy renders any distinction between devise and
descent unnecessary,' 3 and motive immaterial,14 because it does not de-
pend upon the terms of any statute or contract nor upon any particular
fact situation, but is a remedial device intended to prevent unjust
enrichment whenever and wherever found. An advantage of the con-
structive trust is the fact that bona fide purchasers without notice from
the murderer are protected since equity will not raise a trust against
such innocent parties, but will instead raise it on the proceeds of the
property devised or bequeathed to him upon a constructive trust for the persons
who would have been entitled to the property upon the death of the testator if the
devise or bequest had been revoked. (2) Where a person is murdered by his heir
or next of kin and dies intestate, the heir or next of kin holds the property thus
acquired upon a constructive trust for the person or persons who would have been
heirs or next of kin if he had predeceased the intestate.
§188: Where two or more persons have an interest in property and the interest
.of one of them is enlarged by his murder of the other, to the extent to which it
is enlarged, he holds it upon a constructive trust for the estate of the other.
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927), commented upon in 5 N. C. L. REv. 373
(1927).
"°Ames, op. cit. supra note 5 at 316 (1913); Note, 30 HARV. L. REv. 622(1917).
' Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 784 (1894).
" RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §187, comment c (1937).13Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918); Bryant
v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927).14 See note 13 supra.
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sale in the hands of the murderer. The persons entitled to invoke equity's
aid would appear to be those persons who would have inherited had
the murderer predeceased his victim, or, in case of wills, those persons
who would have taken had the bequest or devise to the murderer been
revoked, 15 since the murderer by his act has made his contingent right
absolute thus destroying any possibility that they might succeed to the
victim's estate.
The Georgia Supreme Court would have reached a much sounder
result, in accord with the letter of the 'law and fundamental principles
of equity, had it declared the murderer a constructive trustee of the
property inherited.'
Many states have enacted statutes on this subject,' 7 some for the
specific purpose of overruling judicial decisions allowing the murderer
to inherit. In general, these statutes declare that a murderer may not
take any property, real or personal, from his victim by descent or
devise, but there are variations as to types of devolution affected, 18
crimes included,'0 and requirements of conviction. 20
The North Carolina legislature, after the decision in Owens v.
Owens2x holding that a wife who murdered her husband could not be
denied her dower because only the legislature could prescribe additional
grounds for forfeiture of a statutory right, enacted three statutes.2  The
statutes provide that a spouse convicted of the murder or as an acces-
sory before the fact of the murder of the other shall lose all rights in
the other's personal estate, including the right of administration, a
year's provision, and a distributive share thereof and further shall lose
all right to dower or curtesy and all. rights to property settled on the
deceased solely by reason of the marriage. It will be noted that the
statutes apply only to the husband-wife relation and do not apply to
other realty descending in intestacy or to any property rights conferred
by will. A revisal of the statutes is needed to broaden their scope both
"See RFSTATEmENT, RESTITUTION §187 (1937); Note, 30 HAgv. L. REv. 622(1917).
" For an historical treatment of the problem, see Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-
History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 229(1942), and Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty in New York, I, 11, 20 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 270, 424 (1945).
'7 See statutes collected in 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusEs §478, n. 32 (1946).
ISE.g., CAL. PROD. CODE (Deering, 1941) §258 (applying to intestacy only);
MIss. CODE ANN. (1942) §672 (applying only to wills).
"
0 E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 2, §258 (applying only to murder); KAN.
GEN. STAT. (Corrick, 1933) §22-133 (including manslaughter).
"
0E.g., S. C. CODE (1942) §8874 (conviction of crime necessary); VA. CODE
(Michie et al., 1942) §5274 (no conviction required), and see Ward v. Ward,
174 Va. 331, 6 S. E. 2d 664 (1940) (wherein acquitted murderer was proved
guilty of unlawful homicide in a civil action under the statute, but held not to
have forfeited estate because his motive in committing the murder was not to
acquire property).
" Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888).
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§28-10, 30-4, 52-19.
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as to persons and rights affected. It is believed that the following would
suffice for this purpose:
No person convicted of the murder of another, or as an accessory
before the fact of such murder, shall take any right, title, or interest
in the victim's property, real or personal, by descent, survivorship,
devise, or bequest: Provided that in cases of intestacy or survivorship
such property shall descend to those who would be lawfully entitled
thereto had the murderer predeceased his victim, and in cases of
devise or bequest shall pass to the persons who would have taken had
the devise or bequest to the murderer been revoked. 23
CHARLES D. POWERS.
*2 See comprehensive statute suggested and discussed in Wade, Acquisition of
Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv.
715 (1936).
